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Abstract
Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) was an influential scholar of the seventeenth century, whose
posthumously published Treatise Concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding (1723) shocked many
of his Jesuit friends for its controversial and heretical content. This thesis has investigated the origins and the
development of Huet’s skepticism, analyzing not only the author’s published works, but his marginalia,
correspondence, and manuscripts as well. Thus, this thesis attempted to reconcile Huet’s published works,
including his memoirs, with his private correspondence and manuscripts, resolving the tensions between his
private and public images and revealing the development of his skepticism. Such reconciliation demonstrated
the continuity from Huet’s earlier dogmatic works to his scandalous treatise. In so doing, the thesis showed
that Huet’s intentions were misunderstood by his friends. His skepticism, while appearing to be a heterodox
set of arguments, aimed to preserve theological doctrines from the unscrupulous scrutiny of rational analyses
of the Cartesians. Thus, by showing the weakness of natural human reason and its inability to know anything
with certainty, Huet hoped to prove that natural philosophy had no place in theology and to convince his
readers to submit to faith in the Christian Revelation. By historically analyzing Huet’s ideas in the context of
both his Jesuit education and the debates in which he participated, this thesis has resolved the seeming
incongruity between Huet’s philosophical skepticism and religious devotion, showing how such a seemingly
contradictory position was possible in seventeenth-century France.
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Introduction
 
Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) enjoyed an eminent career for a 
seventeenth-century scholar. Huet was born in Caen to a family of Protestant converts to 
Catholicism and rose to become one of the most respected intellectual figures of his age. 
He was appointed as the assistant tutor to the dauphin in 1670. Four years later he was 
elected to the Académie française. In 1686 he was appointed Bishop of Soissons, though 
his post was later transferred to Avranches. Huet had a productive scholarly career, 
having published the Traitté de l’origine des romans (Treatise on the Origin of Romances 
– 1670), the Demonstratio Evangelica (Proof of the Gospel – 1679), the Censura 
cartesianae philosophiae (Critique of Cartesian Philosophy – 1689), the Alnetanae 
quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei (Alnetian Questions Regarding the Agreement 
between Reason and Faith – 1690), and the Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l'histoire 
du Cartésianisme (New Memoirs to Serve the History of Cartesianism – 1691) in addition 
to other minor but erudite works.  
Despite his extensive scholarly accomplishments and contemporaneous renown, 
Huet likely would have been forgotten by subsequent generations were it not for the 
posthumous publication of his skeptical treatise, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de 
l'esprit humain (A Philosophical Treatise Concerning the Weakness of Human 
Understanding – 1723). Most of those who considered Huet a friend were startled and 
unsettled by his explicit embrace of philosophical skepticism. The views articulated in 
the Traité seemed so distant from those expressed in Huet’s earlier works that some of 
his contemporaries erroneously argued that he could not have written the skeptical 
treatise. This was particularly true of Huet’s Jesuit friends, who were startled by its 
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heretical content and asserted that the work was a forgery.1 The tension between the 
author’s likely intentions and the reception of his work raise a number of revealing and 
historically significant questions. How could Huet, given his deep religious commitment 
to Catholicism, have written such a heterodox and heretical work? If his objective was 
not to undermine but to sustain orthodoxy and to preserve the faith from the assaults of 
reason, why was he so misunderstood by his colleagues? 
Historians have addressed the subject of Huet’s skepticism tangentially, but very 
little scholarship is dedicated solely to Huet’s intellectual world and itinerary. Most of 
Huet’s works remain untranslated, and most of his correspondence is still unpublished. 
While there are two biographies and a number of articles devoted to analyzing Huet’s 
thought, no books in modern intellectual history are devoted entirely to Huet’s 
skepticism. Richard Popkin, generally recognized as the leading authority on the history 
of skepticism, has written several articles comparing Huet to other skeptics of the 
seventeenth century. Thomas Lennon has translated Huet’s Censura cartesianae 
philosophiae and has written articles on the nature of Huet’s skepticism. Lennon argues 
against Popkin’s classification of Huet as a “complete Pyrrhonian skeptic,”2 offering a 
more moderate interpretation of Huet’s Traité.3 While these historians have offered valid 
interpretations of Huet’s skepticism, their analyses have neglected to trace carefully the 
evolution of Huet’s thought through correspondence and other unpublished materials. 
                                                 
1 Thomas M. Lennon, “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit Humain,” 
in Scepticisme et modernité, ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien Charles, (Saint-Etienne: Université de 
Saint-Etienne, 2005), 68. 
2 Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, (San Diego: Austin Hill, 1980), 21. 
3 Lennon, 65-75. 
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April Shelford provided one important exception to this tendency in her Faith and 
Glory: Pierre-Daniel Huet and the Making of the Demonstratio Evangelica (1679), 
published in 1997 as a Ph.D. dissertation. She offers new evidence indicating that Huet 
was committed to philosophical skepticism much earlier than most scholars have 
suggested. Shelford’s dissertation is the first major historical work that is concerned 
specifically with Huet’s intellectual trajectory. Her dissertation places Huet within his 
educational context and interprets his place in it. More importantly for this thesis, 
Shelford’s work incorporates a variety of primary sources, exploiting correspondence and 
manuscripts that are difficult to access. Due to the abundance of primary sources cited in 
Shelford’s work, her dissertation has been a crucial source for this thesis, not so much for 
her interpretation of Huet’s skepticism as for the primary evidence and contextual 
analysis to be found there.4
Huet is also worthy of further investigation because he bequeathed a vast library 
filled with his own marginalia.5 These notes reveal Huet’s private reactions to the texts 
that influenced his intellectual development. In order to gauge these privately expressed 
ideas, this thesis will analyze Huet’s marginalia and the manuscript versions of some of 
his published works. Such unpublished sources reveal a more personal side of Huet, 
allowing for a reconsideration of the assumptions underlying the evolution of his 
skepticism. Thus, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Huet’s published works, including 
                                                 
4 While Shelford does describe Huet’s early commitment to skepticism, she is more concerned with 
studying the Humanist aspects of Huet’s works. Since she is concerned with Huet as a member of a 
scholarly community, the Traité is not her central concern. 
5 Huet left his library to the main convent of the Jesuit order in Paris. His 9,000 volume library was 
purchased by the royal library of Louis XV in 1765. Most of his books are now at the Resereve of the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, identifiable by the engraving Ex libris bibliothecæ quam Illustriss. 
Ecclesiæ Princeps D. Petrus Daniel Huetius, Episcopus Abrincensis Domoi professæ Paris. PP. Soc. Iesu 
Integram Vivens Donavit, anno 1692. For more on the history of Huet’s library see: Charles Urbain, “La 
Bibliothèque de P. Daniel Huet Évèque d’Avranches,” in Bulletin du Bibliophile et du Bibliothécaire, 1910, 
(Paris : Librairie Henri Leclerc), 133-146. 
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his memoirs, with his private correspondence and manuscripts in order to resolve the 
tensions between his private and public images and to understand the development of his 
skepticism.  
Since Huet remains such an understudied and misunderstood thinker, a historical 
investigation of the development of his thought provides a number of benefits for an 
intellectual historian of the seventeenth century. A reinterpretation of Huet’s skepticism, 
taking advantage of the sheer number of unconsulted primary sources, such as marginalia 
and manuscripts, should make possible an improved understanding of Huet’s intellectual 
development. Further, the scarcity of contemporary scholarship on Huet invites new 
questions about the early-modern trends and debates. A study of lesser-known thinkers 
often reveals more about the intellectual trends of a period than studies of “canonical” 
authors, because the former may tend to be more representative of contemporaneous 
opinions. 
While Huet does not figure in the modern canon of early-modern European 
thought, he was an influential thinker during the seventeenth century and was not 
forgotten during the Enlightenment. The eighteenth century's most influential skeptic, the 
Scot David Hume, began his celebrated and notorious Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion with a reference not to the ancient Greek skeptics, but to Huet's skeptical work. 
Remarkably, scholars devote little discussion to Huet’s place in Hume’s Dialogues, in 
which Cleanthes, the interlocutor defending natural philosophy, describes Huet as “a man 
of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, [and who] has 
also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined 
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Pyrrhonism.”6 Cleanthes next states that John Locke was “the first Christian, who 
ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason.”7 The curious 
leap from Huet to Locke reveals a certain tension in early-modern thought. On the 
surface, the fideistic skepticism of Huet appears incompatible with Locke’s view of faith. 
For Huet, faith was the only source of certainty to which man’s feeble reason must 
submit. However, Hume’s presentation of these authors may indicate his own 
understanding of the relationship between skepticism and empiricism. Hume’s Cleanthes 
perceives an intellectual progression from Huet’s assault on reason to Locke’s 
classification of faith under the realm of reason. Where Huet weakened the human 
reliance on reason, Locke unavoidably undermined the reliance on faith by arguing that it 
is inseparable from reason. Thus, for Hume’s interlocutor, the combination of skeptical 
arguments and empirical reasoning was dangerous, leading to the undermining of faith. 
While this is not necessarily Hume’s own view, Cleanthes’ argument certainly presents a 
perspective contemporaneous to Hume, whose use of this perspective reveals the tensions 
between Huet’s intentions and the effects of his philosophical skepticism. Hume’s use of 
Huet also demonstrates the latter’s presence in the Enlightenment.  
Given Huet’s influence on the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, his 
philosophy deserves more careful scrutiny than it has so far received. If we engage in a 
historical investigation of the responses to Huet’s Traité and the origins of his skeptical 
thought, we will understand better the ways in which Huet and those around him 
perceived the relationships between human and divine knowledge, between scientific 
evidence and faith. The study of Huet’s intellectual context will reveal the continuity 
                                                 
6 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 10. 
7 Ibid. 
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from his earlier works to his skeptical treatise, disclosing much about the world whose 
dilemmas and tensions produced such a seemingly eclectic thinker. Furthermore, we will 
better understand why both Huet’s contemporaries and modern historians have been so 
mystified by his legacy. 
Scholars too often classify philosophers in falsely rigid ways that gloss over 
thinkers’ individual differences. Thus, the term “skeptic” itself must be placed in its 
historical context. The word has a loose set of connotations for a modern reader. 
However, ancient and early-modern philosophical schools of skepticism are associated 
with strictly defined sets of arguments regarding the nature and limits of claims of 
knowledge, truth, and certainty. These skeptical movements were by no means 
monolithic, but instead varied in place and time, depending on the intellectual worlds and 
debates around them. Consequently, the investigation into the nature and origins of 
Huet’s skepticism must consider the intellectual context of seventeenth-century France, 
one that gave birth to the most diverse set of skeptical thinkers in early-modern Europe.  
It is impossible to understand this skeptical revival without considering the 
history of the intellectual movement. The origins of the skeptical philosophy derived 
from ancient Greece, when thinkers developed various arguments to establish one of two 
general claims: that no certain knowledge was attainable, or that there was insufficient 
evidence to determine if any such knowledge was attainable.8 The former view is called 
Academic skepticism, while the latter is known as Pyrrhonian skepticism.  
Academic skepticism aimed to demonstrate that any dogmatic proposition (a 
proposition that claimed certainty about the real nature of things) could not be verified 
                                                 
8 Popkin, The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), xvii. 
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with absolute certainty. “Dogmatic” schools suggested that the perception of an object by 
the senses guaranteed its real existence outside the world of human perception. The 
Academics claimed that the evidence of any proposition would be based on either sense 
perception or reasoning and argued that both faculties were unreliable. Since no human 
faculty was capable of verifying that human knowledge about the real natural world was 
accurate, the Academics argued that nothing was certain and that all knowledge was only 
probable.9 While complete certainty could not be attained, a degree of probability could 
be established such that some propositions would contain more certainty than others. This 
school of thought derives its name from the Platonic Academy, where it was formulated 
in the third century B.C.E. “from the Socratic observation ‘All I know is that I know 
nothing.’”10 The formulation is attributed to Arecesilas (c. 315-241 B.C.E.) and 
Carneades (c. 213-129 B.C.E.). It was passed down to the medieval and early-modern 
periods in Cicero’s Academica and Saint Augustine’s Contra Academicos.11
The Pyrrhonian school derives its origins from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275 B.C.E.) 
and his student Timon (c. 315-225 B.C.E.). Considering both the dogmatists and the 
Academics to be extreme, the Pyrrhonians proposed to suspend judgment on all questions 
that seemed to rely on conflicting evidence. For them, skepticism was a state of mind, not 
a commitment to a particular philosophy. Indeed, for Pyrrhonians, the proposition that 
nothing could be known with certainty, if drawn out to its full conclusion, would have to 
include itself. Thus, nothing could be known with certainty, including the proposition that 
                                                 
9 Ibid., xvii-xviii 
10 Ibid., xvii 
11 Ibid. 
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nothing could be known with certainty. A Pyrrhonian skeptic would then achieve a state 
of ataraxia – peace of mind or quietude.12
The basic surviving text of Pyrrhonian skepticism, generally called the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, had been written by Sextus Empiricus around 200 C.E. in Alexandria. 
Sextus also composed the Adversus mathematicos, in which he subjected logic, 
mathematics, astrology, and grammar to skeptical refutations. Unlike Academic 
skepticism, which influenced the Middle Ages through the filter of St. Augustine’s (354-
430) attempted refutations, Pyrrhonian skepticism remained virtually unknown until the 
rediscovery and Latin publication of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism in 1562.13
Prior to the sixteenth century, Academic skepticism had been the sole source of 
skeptical arguments, but the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus allowed various 
reformulations of skeptical philosophy. Further, the exact source of skeptical arguments 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine, because many such arguments were 
formulated or utilized merely to refute dogmatic claims rather than to construct new 
philosophical systems.  
Toward the end of the sixteenth and the first half seventeenth centuries, 
skepticism became particularly influential in France because of the impact of the writings 
of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592). His Apologie pour Raimond Sebonde, published in 
his Essais (Essays – 1580), is generally considered to be the first major early-modern 
presentation of Pyrrhonian thought. However, Montaigne revealed the influence of both 
Pyrrhonian and Academic schools, because he followed both Sextus Empiricus’ 
                                                 
12 Ibid., xix. 
13 José Maia Neto, “Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58 
no. 2 (1997), 198-199. 
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exposition in presenting forms of ancient skepticism and also frequently cited Cicero’s 
Academica.14  
Montaigne himself divided philosophers into “dogmatists, Academics, and 
Pyrrhonians.”15 He found Pyrrhonian doubt to be more radical and more coherent than 
Academic doubt and stressed the intellectual, moral, and religious advantages of 
Pyrrhonian ataraxia.16 He urged that it was “better to remain in suspense than to get 
engaged in so many errors that human fantasy has produced.”17  
Montaigne’s synthesis of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism extends to three 
main realms of human knowledge: natural philosophy, theology, and humanist 
scholarship.18 In the domain of natural philosophy, Montaigne’s skeptical outlook 
questioned the reliability of sense perception, the truth of first principles, the availability 
of a criterion of truth, and the reliance on appearances for formulating positive statements 
about the real nature of things. Montaigne’s exposition of these difficulties raised doubts 
about the possibility of discovering true and certain facts about the world.  
Montaigne’s version of these arguments foreshadowed and influenced further 
skeptical challenges to traditional views in natural philosophy. In the mid-seventeenth 
century, both Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) formulated 
new epistemological and ontological systems, classified by most modern historians of 
skepticism as “mitigated skepticism.” Both used skeptical arguments in order to 
undermine Aristotelian scholasticism (and, in some cases, Cartesianism), and both then 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 201. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 202 quotes Michel de Montaigne, Essays, Book II, Essay 12. 
18 Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 55. 
 9
established natural philosophies that relied on empirical observations and expressed 
limited claims about the probable nature of things.   
Montaigne’s exposition also contained a significant religious dimension. The 
fifteenth-century Spanish theologian Raimond Sebonde (c. 1380-1436) had asserted that 
all the articles of the Christian religion could be proven by natural reason. The main 
objection to this claim was the argument that the most essential articles of Christianity 
were based on faith and not on rational arguments. Montaigne’s defense was an 
underhanded refutation. He first presented a theory of Christianity that relied exclusively 
on faith and then attempted to demonstrate that all reasoning was unsound, showing that 
Sebonde should not be blamed for his theoretical errors.19 Montaigne did not oppose the 
use of reason to support the faith, but he concluded that faith did not depend on any 
human arguments.20 Consequently, any rational claim made to support the faith had to 
assume, in Montaigne’s view, the truth of divine revelation.  
Montaigne himself abided by the Pyrrhonist view that skeptics should accept 
established laws and customs. Thus, he accepted the Catholic faith as a cultural default of 
his particular time and place. He criticized Catholics for subjecting some of their 
doctrines to doubt and urged his Catholic readers to “either submit completely to the 
authority of our ecclesiastical government, or do without it completely.”21 Because 
Montaigne considered human knowledge to be uncertain, he argued against Protestant 
attempts to challenge polemically the Catholic articles of faith.  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 47. 
20 Ibid., 48. 
21 Montaigne, Essays, in The Complete Works of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958), 134. 
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This was a crucial statement in the context of Reformation and Counter-
Reformation currents of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One of the main tenets 
uniting Protestant sects was the principle of scriptura sola, “by Scripture alone.” 
Protestants claimed that all the truths of the Christian religion should be understood from 
Scripture alone. Consequently, they initially argued that interpretive authority beyond 
Scripture was superfluous, since each believer could arrive at an individual understanding 
of truth by reading the Bible. This argument directly challenged the Catholic reliance on 
the doctrinal interpretation of the Church, and it led Catholic apologists such as Francisco 
Suarez (1548-1617) to assert that Scripture was not as clear as the Protestants had argued 
and could only be understood with the aid of the inspired authority of the Church.22 Thus, 
some Catholics referred to skeptical arguments to undermine the Protestant view of 
Biblical interpretation and to preserve orthodoxy.  
Montaigne’s formulation of Christian Pyrrhonism was expanded in the 
seventeenth century by his disciple, the priest and philosopher Pierre Charron (1541-
1603). Charron combined skeptical arguments with the main anti-rationalist currents in 
Christian theology to provide a solid basis for a Christian Pyrrhonism. In Les Trois 
Véritez (The Three Truths – 1594), Charron argued that God’s existence and God’s nature 
could not be known to man because of “our weakness and the greatness of God.”23 Since 
natural human knowledge was irreparably limited, it could never understand an infinite 
being. Thus, Charron argued that God was unknowable for two reasons: because He was 
infinite, and because man was incapable of knowing anything with certainty. 
                                                 
22 Pierre-François Moreau, “Les arguments sceptiques dans la lecture de l’Ecriture sainte,” in Le 
scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle: Le retour de philosophies antiques à l’Age classique, Tome II, ed. 
Pierre-François Moreau, (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 386. 
23 Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 58. 
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Consequently, man had to rely on faith in revelation and on the Church’s interpretation of 
Scripture. Like Montaigne, Charron attempted to show that Christianity was the true 
religion and that the Catholic Church represented its true formulation.  
Finally, Montaigne’s skepticism reveals the “humanistic crisis of knowledge” 
ironically generated by the rediscovery of new schools of ancient thought.24 Popkin 
argued famously that the increased availability of ancient perspectives precipitated a kind 
of learned skepticism, as humanists, faced with a diversity of opinions, found themselves 
unable to determine a conclusively superior theory.25 Montaigne’s Essays combined a 
variety of ancient theories with presentations of cultures of the New World to suggest that 
human opinions and cultures were relative to time, place, and circumstance.  
Montaigne’s skepticism had a profound influence on the seventeenth century not 
only because of its successful popularization, but also because of its far-reaching 
intellectual implications.26 His outlook did not exclusively address natural philosophy or 
theology, but echoed what is known as la crise Pyrrhonienne (the Pyrrhonian crisis) in 
the intellectual life of Europe. Thus, Montaigne both reflected and propagated anxieties 
about the nature of knowledge and certainty on the eve of the intellectual revolution 
about to transform European culture.  
                                                 
24 Ibid., 55. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For more on Montaigne’s influence, see the following works: Frédéric Brahami, Le scepticisme de 
Montaigne, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1997); Peter Burke, Montaigne, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Henri Busson, Littérature et théologie : Montaigne, Bossuet, La Fontaine, Prévost, 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962); Bernard Jean and François Mouret, Montaigne, Descartes et 
Pascal par la dissertation, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971); Pierre Villey, L’influence de 
Montaigne sur les idées pédagogiques de Locke et de Rousseau, (Paris : Hachette, 1911); Pierre Louis 
Joseph Villey-Desmeserets, Montaigne et François Bacon, (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1973); Montaigne: 
scepticisme, métaphysique, théologie, eds. Vincent Carraud, Jean-Luc Marion, Jocelyn Benoist et al. (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 2004). 
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In order to comprehend fully the impact of the skeptical revival in the seventeenth 
century, we must understand that it was by no means a uniform intellectual movement in 
its formulations and goals. In general, skeptical movements in seventeenth-century 
France can be divided into two broad categories. The first category of skeptics included 
figures such as Mersenne and Gassendi, who intended to establish new philosophical and 
scientific systems while taking into account the limits of human knowledge. As will be 
shown in the first chapter, these skeptics voiced dissatisfactions with the Aristotelian 
Scholasticism that permeated European universities at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. These philosophers generally used skeptical arguments in order to undermine 
established philosophical views and to advance new epistemological outlooks. 
The second category, represented by thinkers such as François de La Mothe Le 
Vayer (1588-1672), Simon Foucher (1644-1696), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), 
appeared in the second half of the seventeenth century and employed skepticism for 
primarily religious reasons. Contrary to the crise Pyrrhonienne, this second wave of 
skepticism emerged to counter the mid-century revolution in natural philosophy.  
Struggling to preserve traditional theology from the onslaught of rational criticism, these 
thinkers attempted to elevate the status of faith in supernatural revelation and to show that 
human reason was neither capable of nor responsible for a rational approach to religious 
questions. This latter school of thought is often called “fideist.” 
The combination of skepticism and religious belief may seem counterintuitive to 
modern readers, for whom skepticism is generally associated with religious doubt and 
disbelief. To avoid this anachronism, we must consider skeptical fideism within its 
appropriate historical context. Such an investigation should reveal the origins of this 
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intellectual movement and improve the historical understanding of the intentions of its 
proponents.  
This study will not only show how Huet fits into the second category of fideistic 
skeptics, but it will also evaluate his attitudes and opinions in the intellectual context of 
the seventeenth century. It will demonstrate how a Huet, educated according to the most 
traditional curricula, became, in the eyes of his contemporaries, so opposed to the aims of 
his educational system. That opposition, this thesis will argue, was an invention of Huet’s 
contemporaries reacting to his skeptical treatise and does not accurately reflect Huet’s 
philosophical and theological viewpoints. Finally, this investigation will examine Huet’s 
intentions in composing this work and explain why these intentions were so 
misunderstood by his contemporaries. Consequently, Huet’s reasons for not publishing 
the Traité during his lifetime will become clear. 
The thesis will be divided into three chapters. The aim of the first chapter is two-
fold. First, it will describe Huet’s intellectual world, presenting both the structure and 
content of his education. It also will expose the general philosophical trends in 
seventeenth-century France that influenced the formation of Huet’s thought. It will give 
particular attention to Huet’s own opinions regarding these trends, utilizing his 
correspondence and his memoirs. Second, the chapter will introduce Huet’s Traité 
philosophique de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain, analyzing the actual nature of Huet’s 
skeptical arguments.  
The second chapter will demonstrate in detail the nature of René Descartes’s 
(1596-1650) vital influence on the formation of Huet’s skepticism. It will consider how 
divergent epistemologies led the two thinkers to formulate drastically different views 
 14
about the abilities of human reason. The chapter will establish the relationship between 
Huet’s skepticism and his anti-Cartesianism, showing that these philosophical positions 
are interdependent for Huet. In addition, it will discuss modern interpretations of Huet to 
situate this thesis within contemporary debates.  
The third chapter will address the religious dimension of Huet’s skepticism. It 
will present Huet’s view of the proper relationship between faith and reason and situate it 
among the tensions and debates of seventeenth-century theology. The chapter will 
consider the rational strain of Christianity as exhibited by the proofs of the existence of 
God offered by both the Aristotelian scholastics and the Cartesians. It will juxtapose this 
rationalist theology with the fideistic strain of Christianity, presented in the arguments of 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), La Mothe Le Vayer, and Pierre Bayle. Finally, the chapter 
will explain why Huet chose not to publish his treatise during his lifetime.  
Seventeenth-century debate over the scope and limits of human knowledge, seen 
in bold relief in the case of Pierre-Daniel Huet, changed the thinking and, eventually, the 
curriculum of European civilization. Understanding the contexts, dilemmas, and 
evolution of Huet's thought sheds essential light on a crucial aspect of this process of 
deep, and even revolutionary, conceptual change. It clarifies what was occurring 
historically in a Europe whose mental life was being forever altered by the debates in 
which Huet was a central participant, a framer of issues for others, and a lightning rod for 
those uneasy or, indeed, alarmed about what was occurring among those who would 
teach the next generations of a learned culture that had already transformed Europe's 
understanding of what it was to know and what was out there to be known. 
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Chapter 1: The Unintended Consequences of a Traditional Education  
 
 Pierre-Daniel Huet’s skeptical philosophy can be analyzed within the framework 
of Montaigne’s three realms of human knowledge: theology, natural philosophy, and 
humanist study. Like Montaigne, Huet was a devout Catholic, who saw in skepticism the 
perfect path to the acceptance of revelation. Huet also deeply questioned the possibility of 
attaining any certainty by means of natural philosophy. Finally, Huet’s humanist 
erudition led him to reject traditional philosophical systems and eventually to accept a 
skeptical outlook toward all human opinions.  
 This chapter will describe Huet’s development as a skeptic in the context of his 
education in natural philosophy and his humanist endeavors in the world of Biblical 
exegesis. We will begin by considering Huet’s seventeenth-century education. In 
presenting Huet’s intellectual evolution we will reveal the origins of his skepticism. We 
will then examine the content of Huet’s skeptical treatise to describe the exact nature of 
his skepticism. 
* * * 
Huet began his studies at the Jesuit collège de Mont Royal in Caen. The Jesuit 
curriculum, formally outlined in the Ratio atque institutio studiorum societatis Iesu 
(Method and System of the Studies of the Society of Jesus – 1599), entailed a combination 
of two three-year cycles of instruction in philology and philosophy. Students began with 
the humanities, comprised of an intensive course of Latin grammar and rhetoric, and then 
moved on to study philosophy in the second cycle. The goal of such an education was to 
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produce orthodox apologists for the Catholic cause in response to the Protestant 
Reformation of the sixteenth century.1  
Thus, before considering his education in philosophy, we will address Huet’s 
humanist background and present its manifestation in Huet’s own work. The fundamental 
aim of the humanities course was to produce learned students fluent in both written and 
spoken Latin.2 Latin was the language of science, philosophy, and theology, uniting 
learned Europe with a universal medium of communication. The Jesuits believed that 
classical Latin presented the best linguistic model and used writers such as Ovid, Catullus, 
Virgil, Horace, Livy, Sallust, Caesar, and Propertius. Following the model of Quintilian, 
the Jesuits held poetry to be extremely useful in the development of rhetorical skills.3 
Thus, students were instructed in Latin rhetoric and grammar by both classical poetry and 
prose.  
A Jesuit student was expected to perform extensive Biblical exegesis. Training in 
Greek was deemed essential to real erudition, because it was the original language of the 
New Testament.4 Thus, humanistic study of ancient literature and rhetoric was crucial to 
the formation of a student who could cogently argue on behalf of Catholicism. Cyprian 
Soarez (1524-1593) argued in his De arte rhetorica (Concerning the Art of Rhetoric – 
1562) that training in rhetoric essentially taught the student how to think because reason 
and rhetoric were so deeply intertwined.5
                                                 
1 April Shelford, Faith and glory: Pierre-Daniel Huet and the making of the Demonstratio Evangelica 
(1679), Ph.D. Dissertation, (Princeton University, 1997), 43-44. 
2 Lawrence Brockliss, French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Cultural 
History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 112. 
3 Shelford, Faith and glory, 45 (footnote) and 48. 
4 Brockliss, French Higher Education, 113. 
5 Shelford, Faith and glory, 50. 
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The instruction was not only linguistic, but also moral, providing classical models 
for imitation. The understanding of pagan culture would improve the morality of the 
students and enhance their understanding of the Bible.6 Readings were chosen for their 
ability to reinforce the similarity between Christian values and the ancient examples of 
virtue. Thus, by coming in contact with Latin and Greek texts, students encountered 
various accounts of European history and mythology.7  
For some students, interest in the content of such ancient works surpassed the 
didactic value of linguistic lessons. For instance, Huet saw the study of languages as a 
tool and not as an end, because he came to consider himself an erudite first and foremost: 
I am aware that this study has its use, and even necessity and that a correct knowledge of 
antiquity, which is the best part of polite literature, cannot be obtained without the aide of 
those tongues which were spoken by the nations who have transmitted to us the arts and 
sciences…but let them be regarded as handmaids, who are courted only as leading the 
way to their mistresses, which are the branches of knowledge themselves. Thus, 
languages are the keys by which the doors of learning are to be opened, and those who, 
content with the possession of them, stop at the threshold, and do not penetrate to the 
recesses, may be resembled to janitors, who, bearing the keys to many apartments, 
themselves sleep out of doors.8
 
Thus, perhaps contrary to its intentions, by exposing students to a vast spectrum of 
ancient texts Jesuit education promoted a spirit of erudition that often went beyond 
supplementing exegetical skills.  
Huet left Caen in 1652 to accompany his mentor Samuel Bochart (1599-1667) to 
Sweden and the Netherlands. Huet made use of the many libraries he encountered during 
his voyage. In Denmark he visited Tycho Brahe’s astronomical laboratory and in Sweden 
                                                 
6 François de Dainville, La Naissance de l’humanisme moderne (Paris: Beauchesne, 1940), 217-218. 
7 Shelford, Faith and glory, 51. 
8 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Memoirs of the life of Peter Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches, written by himself. 
trans. John Aiken, (London : Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, ... and Cadell and Davies..., 
1810), 223. I have used an English edition because I planned ultimately to translate all French and Latin 
sources into English. Since a reliable contemporaneous English translation of the Memoirs proved to be 
very close to the French, I have cited it throughout my thesis.   
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he found the manuscript of Origen’s Commentary on St. Matthew. Having copied the 
commentary in Sweden, Huet edited and translated it until 1668.9  
 Such a textual exercise was one of the most basic tasks of a humanist scholar. It 
involved the restoration of the text to its original form, providing a translation if the 
original were not in Latin, and composing a commentary on the primary text. Philological 
expertise in ancient languages was necessary, but an understanding of the particular 
historical and cultural contexts of the texts was equally crucial to revealing their meaning. 
The editor also had to be familiar with all of the references in the text and thus had to 
attain a copious knowledge of diverse subjects. In other words, he had to possess 
erudition.10
Indeed, Huet sought to attain a professional level of Biblical exegesis and would 
surpass many of his peers. He went beyond studying Latin and Greek and tried to learn 
Hebrew in order to read the Old Testament in the original. Bochart assisted Huet in 
improving his Greek and beginning his study of Hebrew. Bochart also stressed the 
importance of Hebrew in his own Geographia sacra (The Sacred Geography – 1646), 
claiming it was the first language, from which all others were derived. In upholding the 
spirit of humanism, Bochart also claimed that the interpreter had to know the meanings of 
proper names in the Bible, had to master geography and history in Scripture and in pagan 
texts, and had to learn the astronomical significance of prophecies.11
Bochart’s Geographia sacra similarly guided Huet to formulate his own research 
interests. Huet composed a work on a similar subject in his short Traité de la situation du 
paradis terrestre (Treatise Concerning the Location of the Terrestrial Paradise – 1691). 
                                                 
9 Shelford, Faith and glory, 78-79. 
10 Ibid., 83-84. 
11 Ibid., 250-253. 
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Bochart’s methodology also proved extremely influential on Huet. In undertaking this 
work, Bochart sought to discover the location of the Garden of Eden and to prove that 
Biblical geography was insufficiently known. He also proposed to discover the origins of 
the first people. Although Bochart suggested that ancient mythologies resembled fables, 
he believed that they could accurately confirm the Biblical account of history. Bochart 
sought to “correlate diverse ancient sources with the Bible” to support this claim. He 
demonstrated similarities between the Bible and pagan sources, such as the Orphic hymns 
and the works of Ovid, Hesiod, Teleclidus, Martial, Plato, Plutarch, and Macrobius. Thus, 
Bochart sought to synthesize the copious data he amassed in order to prove that the Bible 
did indeed provide a complete record of human history, thereby pronouncing the 
universality of the Christian religion.12
Bochart followed in the humanist tradition that, beginning in the fifteenth century, 
integrated ancient mythology, Neo-Platonic, Kabbalistic, and Pythagorean philosophies 
into the framework of Christian Revelation. The basis of this synthesis lay in the belief 
that the most pure form of Christian theology was passed directly from God to Adam and 
was later disseminated and diluted among the ancient peoples.13 The desire to reconcile 
what appeared to be authentic ancient sources with the Bible was a logical one for erudite 
believers. Such a synthesis could ease the tensions created by apparent historical 
discrepancies between the Bible and pagan sources. 
Huet confessed in his memoirs that he did not finish his work on Origen because 
he was “deterred by the magnitude of an obscure task” and because he was contemplating 
“a work of more splendour,” that he “conceived, much more useful to the Christian 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 251-254. 
13 Ibid., 278. 
 20
cause.”14 This work was his Demonstratio Evangelica. Although Huet began with an 
attack on the certainty of geometric principles, he combined moral axioms taken from 
Scripture with a structure of a geometric proof: 
I imagined a new path might be struck out, different from the trodden ones, but certain 
plain, and direct, leading to a demonstration of that truth, not less clear and indubitable 
than the argumentative processes of geometricians, who boast that they do not persuade 
but compel conviction.15
 
This combination was similar to one used by Philippe du Plessis Mornay’s (1549-
1623) De la Vérité de la Religion Chrestienne (Concerning the Truth of the Christian 
Religion – 1581). Mornay argued that the truth of Christianity could be proved using a 
method that resembled a geometric proof. He claimed that just as geometers had to accept 
certain axioms before engaging in geometrical proofs, basic principles could be equally 
established for the demonstration of religious truths. These principles were “God’s 
existence, beneficence, power, and omniscience; the immortality of the soul…and need 
for divine grace.”16 Mornay considered these truths to be universal and believed that 
from them man could arrive at “certain and indubitable” deductions.17  
Despite its confident approach, Mornay’s method failed to prove, for most readers, 
that the truth he sought rested in Christianity. Christian revelations were particular, not 
universal. Therefore, a reliance on faith in revelation was necessary before any of 
Mornay’s principles could be accepted.18 Huet acknowledged the influence of Mornay 
but also voiced his disappointment with the proof: 
I particularly expected much from Philip de Mornai (du Plessis)… But, Good God! How 
were my hopes deceived! I found vain and futile arguments, ancient testimonies collected 
                                                 
14 Huet, Memoirs, v. 2, 156-157. 
15 Ibid., 157. 
16 Shelford, “Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica (1679)” in the 
Journal of the History of Ideas 63 no. 4 (2002), 602-603. 
17 Ibid., 603 quotes and translates Mornay, De la Vérité de la Religion Chrestienne (Paris, 1585), eiii v. 
18 Ibid. 603-604. 
 21
at random, and either misunderstood, or unfaithfully quoted, and errors without 
number.19
 
Unlike Mornay, Huet was writing after the authenticity of the Old Testament had been 
subjected to historical scrutiny. In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theological and 
Political Treatise – 1670), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) questioned the Mosaic 
authorship of the Bible, thereby significantly undermining the historical reliability of 
Scripture. Huet perceived Spinoza as an “unlearned” man who possessed no expertise for 
composing Biblical criticism. He argued that Spinoza borrowed most of his arguments 
from Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).20  
In the Prae-Adamitae (Men Before Adam – 1655) La Peyrère suggested that the 
absence of various peoples from Biblical accounts, and the inconsistency between 
Biblical chronology and that of the Chinese, signaled the fact that the Bible was solely an 
account of Hebrew history and that Adam was not the first man, but the first Jew.21 Such 
an argument undermined both the universality of Christianity and the historical value of 
the Bible. These objections forced Huet to consider essential issues of textual authenticity. 
Huet began his positive proof by providing an ordered set of definitions for the 
following terms: “authentic book,” “contemporary book,” “history,” “prophecy,” “true 
religion,” “Messiah,” and, finally, “Christian religion.”22 Like a true humanist, Huet 
                                                 
19 Huet, Memoirs, v.2, 159-160. 
20 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 191. 
21 Ibid., 282. 
22 Ibid., “Thinking Geometrically”, 612 quotes the Demonstratio Evangelica: “1. An authentic book is one 
that was written by that author by whom it was said to have been written and around that time when it was 
written…2. A contemporary book is one that was written around that time when events related in it 
occurred…3. A history is a narrative of things that occurred in that time about which history is written… 4. 
A prophecy is a narrative of future events that had not yet occurred at the time when that prophecy was 
announced and which could not have been foreseen from natural causes. 5. A true religion is one that 
proposes only true things to be believed. 6. The Messiah is the man/God sent by God providentially for our 
salvation and predicted by the Prophets of the Old Testament. 7. The Christian Religion is that which 
establishes that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, and hold whatever has been written about him in the 
sacred books, whether the Old or New Testaments, as true.” 
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believed the authenticity of the texts to be an essential indicator of their historical value. 
Like Bochart, Huet sought to consult both pagan and Christian sources, and he “resolved 
to pass no work on the same topic, whether ancient or modern, without examination.”23 
Huet similarly aimed to synthesize these accounts: 
We will demonstrate that those earliest Gods and Heroes of the peoples, whomsoever 
were worshipped throughout nearly the whole world, [and] indeed similarly the many 
founders and legislators and all the theology of the Pagans followed either from Moses 
himself or from the acts of Moses or from his writings.24
 
Huet’s insatiable quest for knowledge was evident from his earliest years as a student. He 
confessed how he was often mocked by his peers for his overly studious nature, and how 
these insults only invigorated his passion for learning.25 Thus, Huet serves as a typical 
example of a humanist of his generation. His intellectual curiosity grew proportionally to 
the number of texts he discovered, driving him to an inexorable quest for certainty and 
concordance among these sources, a certainty he never attained. 
While the Demonstratio Evangelica represented the efforts of a humanist and a 
Biblical exegete, it also revealed Huet’s interest in geometry. In the following chapter we 
will address the anti-Cartesian dimension of the Demonstratio and describe Huet’s 
attempt to equate geometric certainty with historical certainty. Huet’s most influential 
teacher, Father Pierre Mambrun (1601-1661), who taught at Caen from 1647 to 1653, 
introduced him to formal philosophy after subjecting him to a rigorous course of 
geometry.26 Huet remembered the experience in his memoirs:  
Although I by no means repented the labour I had bestowed on geometry, yet I was 
rendered sensible of the injury I had sustained by the neglect of philosophy, concerning 
                                                 
23 Huet, Memoirs, v.2, 159. 
24 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 281 quotes Demonstratio Evangelica Proposition IV.3.I. 
25 Huet, Mémoires (1718), (Toulouse: Société de Littératures Classiques, 1993), 18. 
26 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 54. 
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which it was said by the ancients, that no gift more excellent had been, not would be, 
conferred by the Gods upon mankind.27
 
Despite the rigors of Mambrun’s instruction, Huet became deeply attached to his teacher. 
Mambrun served as a surrogate father for Huet, and the two remained close friends until 
Mambrun’s death in 1661. This friendship can be traced through an extensive 
correspondence, in which Huet often recounted his spiritual and intellectual endeavors.28
Upon commencing the study of geometry with Mambrun, Huet began the second 
cycle in the Jesuit curriculum, that of philosophy. This broad discipline encompassed 
logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy. The study of philosophy 
supplied the students with conceptual instruments they would need at the advanced 
faculties of theology, law, and medicine.29 The curriculum of this cycle was based on the 
scholastic tradition of Aristotelian science; as the Ratio Studiorum instructed, “In matters 
of any importance, let him not depart from Aristotle [unless Aristotle conflicts in some 
way with the conclusions of Christian teaching].”30
 During the seventeenth century the course in logic relied on Aristotle’s Organon: 
The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and On 
Sophistical Refutations. The student first was introduced to the rules of logic and “the 
three distinctive mental operations: apprehension, judgment, and ratiocination.”31 Then 
the student learned how the rules of logic could be applied to the “investigation and 
demonstration of knowledge.”32  
                                                 
27 Huet, Memoirs, v.1, 26. 
28 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 54-55. 
29 Brockliss, French Higher Education, 185. 
30 Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1650-1729 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 82 
quotes the translation of A.R Ball, “The Ratio Studiorum,” in St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum, ed. 
Edward. A. Fitzpatrick (New York and London, 1933), [119-254], 168. 
31 Brockliss, French Higher Education, 194. 
32 Ibid. 
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Pierre Gautruche (1602-1681), who also instructed Huet at Caen, composed a 
textbook Philosophiae ac Mathematicae totius clara, brevis et accurate institution (The 
clear, brief, and precise instruction in all philosophy and mathematics – 1661). 
Gautruche carefully followed the Aristotelian division of philosophy in his organization 
of the work. He began his epistemological discussion with the Aristotelian dictum, “there 
is nothing in the mind that has not first been in the senses” and sought to define the tools 
for the accurate interpretation of sense experience.33 These tools included argument, 
method, definition and division.34
The use of the syllogism was essential to Aristotelian philosophy. An example of 
a conclusion proved by a syllogism appears in Huet’s own skeptical treatise: “Peter is a 
rational animal.”35 The conclusion can be derived from two premises: the particular 
premise would argue that Peter is a man, while the general premise would state that all 
men are rational animals. The conclusion to any syllogism depended on the logical 
relationship between universal and particular propositions. Gautruche and other 
Aristotelians believed that the syllogism was capable of yielding new knowledge that 
described the real nature and causes of things.36
However, the usefulness of the syllogism was not uncontested among the students 
of scholasticism. In the Traité, Huet criticized the circular nature of this method:  
They would prove for Instance that Peter is a rational Animal: See how they reason. 
Every Man is a rational Animal; Peter is a Man, therefore Peter is a rational Animal. The 
first of these Propositions being universal, does principally pass for true, because every 
Man in particular is a rational Animal…out of the Mass of these particular propositions, 
which declare every man to be a rational Animal, this universal Proposition was formed; 
viz. every Man is a rational animal: from thence it follows that the Certainty of this 
                                                 
33 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 378-380. 
34 Ibid., 380. 
35 Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, trans. Edw. Combe, (London: printed 
for Matthew de Varenne, 1725), 67. 
36 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 381-384. 
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universal Proposition, depends on the Certainty of all those particular Propositions. But in 
reasoning we now call into account, the Certainty of the particular Proposition depends 
on the Certainty of the universal…thus we fall into that vicious Reasoning called a 
Circle.37
  
For Huet, the syllogism could not prove anything with certainty, because the premises 
were interdependent on each other and could not withstand scrutiny autonomously.  
In general, the Aristotelian scholastics considered all objects in terms of their 
substantial and accidental properties. The substantial properties were those necessary to 
the object, belonging to its essence. Absent this essence, the object could no longer 
maintain its particular identity. Accidental properties were unessential, literally and 
metaphorically, and were often virtually interchangeable. These included color, size, 
shape, and other properties that could change without transforming the essence of an 
object. Furthermore, Aristotle had drawn a distinction between matter and form and had 
argued that when a change takes place, the matter remains invariable while the form 
alters. 
The Aristotelian notion of causality outlined four classes of causes: material, 
formal, efficient, and final. The material cause described the matter from which the thing 
came to be. The formal cause described the particular essence of the thing. The efficient 
cause was the agent that actualized a form from its material cause. The final cause was 
the purpose for which the thing existed. Such a classification of causes was seen as 
particularly problematic for the critics of Aristotelianism, because it made claims about 
the real, not just the apparent, nature of things.  
Various challenges to the Aristotelian philosophy emerged in the seventeenth 
century. One of the earliest oppositions to Aristotelian Scholasticism was formulated by 
                                                 
37 Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, 67. 
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Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England. The Baconian intellectual revolution swept 
England and offered an entire re-organization of human knowledge. Identifying the key 
faults in the epistemological and ontological frameworks proposed by Aristotelian 
Scholasticism, Bacon reinforced the empirical nature of human knowledge. Thus, he 
branded the method of induction as the best way of learning and knowing things about 
the world. Bacon’s induction was based on gathering evidence and only later organizing 
it into more general categories, always leaving room for adjustment. Though the 
Aristotelians were also technically empiricists, Bacon sought to oppose the scholastic 
method of deduction, largely based on the logic of syllogisms. He argued this method 
was not capable of creating new knowledge because the syllogism did not accurately 
reflect “the subtlety of nature.” He also wrote, “The logic now in use serves rather to fix 
and give stability to the errors which have foundations in currently received notions.”38  
 Bacon’s New Organon (1620) emphasized the limits of human knowledge, but 
used this emphasis to advocate an improvement in the gathering of knowledge. Thus, he 
proposed the use of instruments and experiments to assist the weakness of the human 
senses. Bacon’s epistemological emphasis on empiricism and his proposed method of 
experimentation inspired a following of natural philosophers, primarily in England. 
Thinkers such as Robert Boyle, John Locke, and Isaac Newton all emerged as the 
luminaries of the new Baconian world. These natural philosophers dramatically 
revolutionized their disciplines, sweeping away traditionally established university 
curricula.  
In France, René Descartes and his new system presented the most direct threat to 
Aristotelian scholasticism. Bacon did not drastically revise Aristotelian epistemology, but 
                                                 
38 Francis Bacon, New Organon, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960), 41. 
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rather attempted to apply Aristotle’s notion that nothing comes into the mind but from the 
senses. Descartes, on the other hand, presented a rationalist epistemology that argued for 
the existence of innate knowledge in the human mind. The most basic disagreement 
between the Aristotelian and Cartesian systems consisted in this difference in 
epistemology. Unlike the Aristotelians, Descartes did not think that all knowledge arose 
from sense experience. In his Meditationes de prima philosophia (Meditations on First 
Philosophy – 1641) and in his Principia Philosophiae (Principles of Philosophy – 1644), 
Descartes argued that the human mind, by the light of reason alone, could arrive at 
substantive truths concerning the fundamental laws of nature.39 For example, he asserted 
that the total quantity of motion in the world was conserved, and that this was known a 
priori, following necessarily and logically from the immutability of God. Accordingly, 
for Descartes, the basic structure of the world was discovered independently of 
experience, was metaphysically necessary, and was known with metaphysical certainty.  
Descartes based his foundational conception of knowledge on a single indubitable 
certainty, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I exist), from which he derived his criterion 
of truth.40 For the Cartesians, knowledge could be attained and verified through intuition 
and demonstration. Human beings could only be certain of those things of which they 
formed clear and distinct ideas and the truth of which they could demonstrate. Thus, if 
one clearly and distinctly perceived the necessary existence of God and of substance in 
one’s mind, these objects had to exist necessarily in the realm of objective reality.41  
                                                 
39 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald Cress, (Indianapolis, Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 19-20; Descartes, Discourse on the Method, in Discourse on Method 
and Related Writings, trans. Desmond Clarke (New York, London: Penguin Books, 1999), 26. 
40 Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 25. 
41 Descartes, Meditations, 28. 
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In general philosophical terms, this debate is known as one between schools that 
favor either a posteriori reason or a priori reason, that is, between empiricists and 
rationalists, a debate whose roots can be found in the ancient contest between 
Aristotelians and Platonists. Empiricists argued that human beings arrive at knowledge of 
the external world through sense experience, suggesting that the origin of all ideas about 
the natural world is external to the mind. A mind before sense experience is thus a tabula 
rasa. Proponents of a priori reason, the rationalists, on the other hand, claimed that all 
human beings are born with certain innate ideas, and therefore, some ideas do not come 
into the mind through the senses. In the context of seventeenth-century France, this 
debate is manifested by the contest between the Aristotelian Scholastics and the 
Cartesians.  
This epistemological debate was heightened by a theological dispute about the 
consequences of original sin and man’s fall from grace. The theological dispute derives 
its origins from the tension between Augustinian and Thomistic thought.42 The view 
advanced by St. Augustine (354-430) stressed the fatal consequences of the fall, arguing 
that it inherently corrupted man’s knowledge, especially given the severe limitations of 
imperfect, corporeal sense experience. Thus, for the Augustinians, man’s soul was so 
corrupted that it could never arrive at true knowledge or certainty without divine 
guidance and intervention. The Thomists, who followed the doctrines of theologian St. 
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274), disputed such a pessimistic view of the human condition. 
They agreed that man’s natural light was lost after the fall and that all knowledge had to 
be gained through the senses. However, unlike St. Augustine, who lamented the 
corporeality of man’s fallen condition, St. Thomas remained confident that true and 
                                                 
42 Kors, 266. 
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certain knowledge, including proofs of the existence of God, could be arrived at a 
posteriori, from the experience of the external world.43  
In physics and metaphysics, Descartes proposed a new system that distinguished 
all substances into two sorts: immaterial thinking being and corporeal extended being.44 
He asserted the essence of mind to be thought and the essence of matter to be extension. 
The existence of both of these was guaranteed by a perfect being: God.45  
Under this division, the Cartesians systematically rejected the Aristotelian notion 
of causality and instead proposed, in physics, a purely mechanistic universe. In 
opposition to the Aristotelian system that distinguished between substantial and 
accidental forms, Cartesianism considered physical phenomena only in terms of 
extension and motion. 
Natural philosophers welcomed the Cartesian revolution, because it presented 
concrete methods that could be supported by evidence. The Dutch mathematician, 
astronomer, and physicist, Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695), proclaimed his approval for 
the Cartesian system, contrasting it with Aristotelian scholasticism: 
What was very evident in the beginning, when this philosophy [of Descartes] had just 
begun to appear, is that one understood what Mr. Descartes said unlike the other 
philosophers who used words which caused nothing to be understood, such as qualities, 
substantial forms, intentional species, etc. He rejected this impertinent rubbish more 
completely than anyone had ever done.46
 
Huygens perceived the Aristotelian philosophy as an impediment to the understanding of 
natural philosophy, because scholastic classifications failed to reflect the apparent nature 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 299. 
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of the physical world. Like Thomas Hobbes, who defined all terms without sensory 
referents to be literally and metaphorically “non-sense,” Huygens was frustrated by the 
obscurity of the Aristotelian terminology. Cartesian physics offered natural philosophers 
the opportunity to address physics mechanistically and empirically. 
In his youth Huet was similarly attracted to the apparent clarity of the Cartesian 
system, but he later came to reject its tenets: 
At this period Descartes published the principles of his sect; and as, during the three 
preceding years, I had given my attention to philosophy, and was abundantly furnished 
with the dogmas and precepts of this science, I felt an ardent desire to become acquainted 
with the opinions of this writer…and I cannot easily express the admiration which this 
new mode of philosophizing excited in my young mind, when, from the simplest and 
plainest principles, I saw so many dazzling wonders brought forth, and the whole fabric 
of the world and the nature of things, as it were, spontaneously springing to existence… 
and I long wandered in the mazes of this reasoning delirium, till mature years, and a full 
examination of the system from its foundations, compelled me to renounce it, as I 
obtained demonstrative proof that it was a baseless structure, and tottered from the very 
ground.47
 
The emphasis that Huet placed on the apparent simplicity of the Cartesian system 
resembled Huygens’s sentiment about Cartesianism’s appeal to natural philosophers, but 
it also signaled, perhaps above all, his dissatisfaction with Aristotelian scholasticism. 
 In a letter from Huet to Mambrun in 1660, the former revealed a turn away from 
Aristotelianism to Greek atomism in the consideration of natural philosophy and 
metaphysics: 
Although, indeed, like other men, [Aristotle] prated idly about some matters sometimes 
(and most of all in physics), he was, nonetheless most admirably expert in other subjects. 
He skillfully revealed such an infinity – and clearly such a great abundance – of things 
nature had concealed. Certainly regarding the principles of physics, I strongly approve 
the ideas of Leucippus, ideas that were then asserted and skillfully fashioned by 
Democritus and Epicurus. Indeed, I cannot either grasp nor mediate very well that first 
material [the Peripatics] call substantial forms. Apparently the hypothesis of atoms is 
easier [to comprehend] and more suited to the appearance of the truth.48
 
                                                 
47 Huet, Memoirs, v.1, 29. 
48 BN Ms. Lat., 11432, fol. 101-102. (Quoted and translated by Shelford, Faith and Glory, 426-427). 
 31
Huet communicated these sentiments privately and, until the publication of the Traité, he 
refrained from openly criticizing the Aristotelians. His expressions of anti-
Aristotelianism, when published, were always implicit. For example, when attacking the 
Cartesian notion of the mind, Huet designated an Epicurean and not an Aristotelian to be 
his spokesman against the notion of immaterial thought.49 Similarly, Huet conflated 
Aristotelian and Epicurean ideas to oppose the Cartesian notions of causality and 
metaphysics. He chastised the Cartesian argument regarding causes and effects, claiming 
that it was “as easy for Descartes to produce from it some imaginary world as to produce 
this world.”50 Aristotle and Epicurus, on the other hand, “were able to validly infer 
specifically defined effects.”51
Huet’s rejection of Cartesianism will be thoroughly addressed in the following 
chapter, but it is important to identify when Huet decisively turned away from 
Descartes’s philosophy. In 1666, he wrote a letter to his Jesuit friend René Rapin (1621-
1687), describing his intellectual endeavors: 
During this retreat, I recently determined to battle Cartesianism, and to recall it before the 
bar of my judgment. A bold deed, if that doctrine is taken at the mad value given it in this 
age. If however, one considers the matter [the philosophy] in and of itself, and 
investigates it carefully, starting with its principles, nothing is more futile.52
 
Later in his life, Huet devoted two works to a refutation of the Cartesian system. The 
Censura cartesianae philosophiae was a serious philosophical work that attacked the 
basic epistemological and ontological arguments of Descartes. The Nouveau mémoires 
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pour servir à l'histoire du Cartésianisme was, by contrast, a parody that related a fictional 
account of Descartes (who at this point was long dead) living in Lapland and teaching 
philosophy.  
 Huet’s rejection of Descartes should also be considered in the context of a second 
major response to Aristotelian scholasticism in seventeenth century France. Marin 
Mersenne and Pierre Gassendi presented a skeptical challenge to the scholastic world, but 
maintained a limited role for skepticism. While rejecting the Aristotelian and the 
Cartesian notions that certain and necessary truths could be established about the nature 
of reality, Mersenne and Gassendi accepted the possibility of attaining probable 
knowledge based on appearances. Thus, although they did not accept the ultimate 
conclusions of the Pyrrhonists, they rejected the dogmatic principles of the Aristotelians 
and of the Cartesians.  
Mersenne composed an attack on Pyrrhonism in his La Vérité des Sciences contre 
les Sceptiques ou Pyrrhoniens (The Truth of the Sciences Against the Skeptics or 
Pyrrhonians – 1625). He argued that although the skeptics were correct regarding the 
human inability to know the real nature of things, they erroneously rejected the useful 
information that could be gained about the apparent nature of the world. Thus, one had to 
accept that at least something could be and was known about the world.53 Mersenne’s 
work consists of a discussion between an alchemist, a skeptic, and a Christian 
Philosopher. The alchemist likely represented the Aristotelian system, because he 
neglected to refer to sense experience in his account for the natural world. Mersenne 
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favorably situated himself between the extremes of dogmatists and skeptics, proposing a 
new limited form of empiricism.  
Gassendi, who, like Mersenne, was a cleric, adopted a similar philosophical 
framework. He criticized the dogmatic view for exaggerating the power of the human 
mind, while chastising the skeptics for adopting the opposite extreme. The senses could 
prove to be unreliable, but their errors could be corrected and their reliability increased.54 
Gassendi also attempted to establish the exact nature of his epistemological world view.55 
In his De vita et moribus Epicure (Concerning the Life and Morals of Epicurus – 1647) 
and his Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii (Notes on the Tenth Book 
of Diogenes Laertius – 1649), Gassendi revived Epicurean atomism, proposing it as a 
new alternative for natural philosophy. His system provided explanations of the basic 
physical, chemical, and biological phenomena by referring to the ancient Greek notion 
that all matter is composed of infinitely small matters moving in a void. Gassendi 
modified the classical theory by suggesting that atoms were created and set in motion by 
God.56   
 Gassendi’s and Mersenne’s ontological and epistemological systems presented a 
middle ground for the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. Thus, they adhered 
to skepticism in opposition to the dogmatic schools of Cartesianism and Aristotelianism 
and sought to construct new physical and metaphysical systems. However, they did not 
persistently address the religious dimension of skepticism. Huet’s epistemological 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 121-122. 
55 Ibid., 120-121. 
56 Matthew R. Goodrum, “Atheism, and the Spontaneous Generation of Human Beings:  
The Debate over a Natural Origin of the First Humans in Seventeenth-Century Britain,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 63 no. 2 (2002), 208. 
 34
theories had much in common with those of Mersenne and Gassendi, but he was 
committed to skepticism for religious and not for scientific reasons.  
 While Huet’s skeptical treatise was not published until 1723, he composed it 
between 1690 and 1692.57 In addition to hiding his work until his death and writing it 
under the pseudonym Théocrite de Pulvignac, seigneur de la Roche, Huet framed the 
Traité in a way that rhetorically distanced him from its main ideas.58 Thus, he began his 
preface by stating, “Hear, my dear Friends not my Opinion, touching the Nature of 
human Understanding, and Reason, but that of an excellent Person, very well versed in 
all the ancient and modern Sects of Philosophy.”59 All the subsequent arguments on 
behalf of skepticism and its benefits are advanced by this “provincial Man of Quality.”60  
 While such a framing may seem a commonplace literary device, Huet’s encounter 
with the provincial man of quality was anything but fictional. As evident from his 
Mémoires, Huet’s interlocutor was Louis Cormis, whom Huet met in Caen toward the 
end of the 1650’s.61 Although the exact date of their meeting remains unknown, the 
meeting took place before 1660, when Huet confessed skepticism in a letter to Mambrun. 
In the Mémoires, he wrote: 
And hardly a day passed without him coming to see me or I going to see him and together 
we strolled, either along the most agreeable banks of the Orne or through the greenest 
meadows. Moreover, we generally conversed about the ancient philosophical sects, since 
he was not only exceptionally learned in all of them, but especially so in those that 
commanded the mind to abstain from all assent. And thus above all he wholly approved 
Sextus Empiricus’ teachings, and his commendation so affected [me] that the author who 
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until then had been merely a name to me was read by me diligently, became very familiar 
to me, and I conceived the highest opinion of him.62
 
This passage presented one of Huet’s only published revelations of his personal 
predilection for Sextus Empiricus. Because the Mémoires were published during his 
lifetime, Huet was careful to exclude any expressions of commitment to skepticism itself. 
He declared his “high opinion” of Sextus Empiricus, but did not state that he became a 
skeptic. Instead, he described his affinity for Cormis, whose influence was crucial to 
Huet’s eventual commitment to skepticism. Huet’s autobiographical account of the 
encounter with Cormis was very similar to his description of the interlocutor in the Traité. 
Before articulating his skepticism, Huet’s interlocutor described his intellectual 
progression: 
I was very much disturbed at those perpetual Disputes of Philosophers, upon all Subjects; 
and in Expectation of the great Advantages of Philosophy, which were so much boasted 
of, Knowledge of Truth, and Tranquility of Mind: I was much surprised to find my self 
plunged in the thick Darkness of invincible Ignorance, and Debates of which I could see 
no End. And being educated in the Philosophy of Aristotle, according to the Custom of 
the Age, I was still more astonished that the Sect of that Philosopher only, should be able 
to produce so great a Diversity of Opinions, of Greeks, Arabians, and Latins, of Ancients 
and Moderns.63
 
This account described the consequences of a philosophical itinerary that ended in a 
complete disillusionment with all dogmatic systems. While the passage specifically 
pertained to Cormis, it could easily be applied to Huet’s own quest for a coherent 
philosophical system. Like Huet, Cormis was educated as an Aristotelian, but soon he 
became disappointed with the number of disagreements within the Aristotelian school 
itself.64 He was attracted to the novel system proposed by Descartes, but he did not find it 
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to be more convincing than the Aristotelian system.65 Cormis turned to Gassendi and 
then to Plato, but, once again, remained unconvinced by the tenets of either school. 
Finally, Cormis encountered the skeptical doctrines of Arcesilas, Carneades, and Pyrrho. 
Although he did not “approve of their Opinion in everything,” he agreed with the general 
notion that neither he “nor any other Man else ever had any natural Faculty to discover 
Truth with full and absolute Assurance.”66
 While Cormis’s road to skepticism may not exactly mirror Huet’s intellectual 
odyssey (for instance, there is no evidence that Huet was ever attracted to Platonism), the 
two intellectual journeys have essential things in common. The quest for truth and 
certainty within various philosophical systems led both to question and eventually to 
reject man’s ability to know any philosophical truths with certainty. Huet and Cormis 
accepted the basic tenets of skeptical philosophy, because they agreed with its account of 
the limited nature of human understanding. 
 The distinction between ontological and epistemological skepticism is crucial to 
understanding Huet’s skeptical system. An ontological skeptic would typically assert that 
true and certain knowledge of the natural world did not exist. On the other hand, an 
epistemological skeptic, like Huet, did not reject the theoretical existence of such certain 
knowledge, but simply denied the human ability to gain it in practice by means of sense 
experience and reason.67 Thus, as he claimed in Book II of the Traité:  
I deny not but there is Truth, to be found in things themselves, I mean that which is called 
Truth of Existence: for God knows things as they really are. But there is an Impediment 
in Man, which withholds him from it, and this impediment consists in the Want of proper 
and necessary Means to know Truth perfectly.68
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 Huet’s basic skeptical conclusion about the weakness of the human mind was 
formulated in a series of definitions in the first chapter of the Traité. He defined 
philosophy as the “Study of Wisdom, the search of Truth…by the assistance of 
Reason.”69 He then identified the human mind as “A Principle, or Power born in Man, 
moved or excited to form Ideas, and Thoughts, by the Reception and Impression of 
Species in the Brain.”70 These species were “traces imprinted into the Brain by the 
Motion of the Spirits and Nerves, when they are agitated by the Organs of Sensation.”71 
From this, it followed that an “Idea or an Image” was the result of this impression.72 
Huet’s first three definitions revealed his empirical epistemology, suggesting that all 
ideas come into the mind from external sources through the senses.  
He further defined thought as “the Action of the Understanding, moved and 
determined by Species in the Brain, to form to it self Ideas, to compare, and judge of 
them together.”73 Reason, for Huet, was the faculty of human understanding that 
searched “after Truth by its natural Operations.”74 Finally, Huet defined the “truth of 
judgment” as the “agreement or correspondence” between the object of consideration that 
existed outside of human perception and the idea or image of that object in the human 
mind.75 Thus, an agreement between the object and the idea of that object required the 
knowledge of both. However, since the human mind could only know the external objects 
through the ideas formed by the mind, the verification of an agreement between the 
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object and the idea proved impossible. Consequently, Huet concluded that “man cannot 
know Truth with perfect Certainty by the Aid of Reason.”76
Building on these definitions, Huet proposed that there were “two ways of 
knowing Truth” – with uncertainty or certainty.77 The latter path to truth was further 
divided into two degrees: divine and human certainty. Huet claimed that human certainty 
could be considered in degrees of probability but could never reach an absolute level.78  
Huet’s letter to Mambrun, expressing his predilection for Epicurean theory also 
revealed his probabilistic view of knowledge. Having declared his preference for the 
atomistic theory Huet wrote:  
However, I desire that these be admitted only as hypotheses – not as the Democretians 
considered them, i.e., absolute [truth]. All things certainly have their origins in atoms, 
and thus are [destroyed] when resolved into them; they appeared to adhere to this opinion 
as if to a sacrament. I in truth admit this as most probable, not as certain. Most pleasing is 
the method of the best Academy of which Carneades is reported the father, because truly 
they sought that which had the appearance of truth and the probable: moreover, 
[Carneades] discerned nothing as true and proven, and swore by the words of no master; 
but secured that which had the appearance of truth from whatever source it might arise, 
and rested in that.79
 
Thus, Huet combined dogmatic Epicureanism with Academic skepticism and argued that 
all conclusions about the physical world were provisional. While Huet accepted that there 
were probable systems of natural philosophy, he refused to grant full certainty to any 
such system. The letter also indicates that he had adopted a skeptical outlook in 
epistemology by the age of thirty, before having published any of his major works. Thus, 
Huet’s private correspondence proves useful, because it reveals candid expressions of 
philosophical views that Huet did not advertise openly until the publication of the Traité.  
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In the Traité, Huet argued that in contrast to the probabilistic nature of human 
certainty, divine certainty, attained by faith in divine revelation, guaranteed true 
knowledge about God’s revelation and provided the highest degree of assurance.80 Thus, 
having formulated his view of man’s inherent inability to arrive at certainty through 
reason, Huet urged his readers to rely on faith for “fortifying the Imbecility of Reason 
and the Senses, dissipating the Obscurity of Doubts, and sustaining the anxious Mind.”81
In Book II of the Traité, Huet argued that the ultimate end of suspending 
judgment in the search for philosophical truths was not to avoid error, but to “prepare the 
mind for the Reception of divine Faith.”82 While faith provided the highest attainable 
level of earthly certainty, it nonetheless remained beneath the “certainty of the Blessed” 
that occurred only in the afterlife.83 Huet’s pessimism regarding man’s rational abilities 
was in many ways similar to Augustinian arguments about the consequences of the fall. 
Huet not only rejected the possibility of knowing truth through reason, but he argued that 
faith itself could not be an absolute basis of certainty, constrained as it was by man’s 
earthly nature.  
Book I of Huet’s Traité furnished a series of attempts to prove the inadequacy of 
human reason. He reaffirmed the religious and Scriptural basis of his skepticism, citing 
Solomon’s statements about the uselessness of man’s inexorable and doomed search after 
truth, the corruption of the soul by the body, and the weakness of man’s reason.84 He 
quoted various arguments of the holy fathers of the Church: Arnobius, Lactantius, and 
Gregory Nazanien. Huet offered St. Augustine’s description of human understanding as 
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“obscured by the habitual Darkness, with which it is covered in the Night of Sin, [and] 
cannot readily see the clearness nor Sanctity of Reason.”85 Finally, Huet claimed that 
even St. Thomas Aquinas “pronounced that our Minds are so hampered by the Senses, 
they cannot comprehend Things perfectly, and their imbecility is so great, that if they 
would judge of Matters which are certain in themselves, they will become uncertain.”86
Huet marshaled a series of detailed proofs of the weakness of the human mind, 
referring to the nature of things, the nature of the mind itself, the incomprehensibility of 
the essence of things, the continuing mutability of things, the difference in and 
imperfection of human perception, the infinity of causes, the absence of a criterion of 
truth, the inadequacy of evidence, the circular nature of proving the certainty of reason by 
reason, and the fallibility of all dogmatic opinions. Huet’s last demonstration provided 
the articulation of the law of doubting, as advanced by a variety of ancient philosophers.  
Book II proposed “the most sure and legitimate way of Philosophizing,” 
elaborating upon the issues proposed in the first book. Huet stressed that “man is by 
nature so made, that he cannot himself attain to the Knowledge of Truth.”87 He sought to 
substantiate the supplementary role of faith with respect to reason, and he proposed the 
exact purposes of doubting. Toward the end of the book, Huet urged that philosophers 
should not tie themselves “to the Sentiments of any Author,” but select from every sect 
that which has “some Appearance of Truth.”88 He concluded the second part of the Traité 
by refusing to adhere to any particular skeptical school: “Not being an Academick, 
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Sceptick, Eclectick, or of any other Sect I must answer I am my own, that is to say at 
liberty, unwilling to submit to any Authority.”89  
His refusal to accept fully the principles of any single system, including some 
tenets of the skeptics, certainly indicates that Huet was attempting to remain consistently 
skeptical throughout his Traité. An espousal of any particular philosophical system would 
have jeopardized the aim of Huet’s project. He ended the Traité by outlining and 
answering the major objections to the proposed system, showing both his willingness to 
entertain objections and his system’s ability to withstand them. Indeed, Huet left the 
reader of the Traité with the freedom to accept or reject the skeptical system, thereby 
placing his audience in the identical position with respect to himself, that he occupied 
with respect to Cormis.  
While the most general aim of Huet’s Traité was to advocate the utility of 
skepticism for philosophy and for religion, Huet’s main argument appears to be contrary 
to the spirit of Pyrrhonian doubt. The first two books aimed to demonstrate definitively 
the weakness of the human mind and of human reason and man’s consequent inability to 
attain true and certain rational knowledge. While this formulation led the author to 
advance a skeptical outlook in philosophy, the hypothesis is anything but Pyrrhonian in 
its nature. Huet indeed subjected all rational conclusions to doubt, but he affirmed with 
complete certainty the weakness of the human mind. This element remains the sole 
constant throughout Huet’s Traité and stands in direct opposition to the Pyrrhonian 
proposition that man cannot know anything with certainty, including the very proposition 
that man cannot know anything with certainty. Therefore, Huet should be classified as an 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 176. 
 42
Academic and not as a Pyrrhonian skeptic, since he affirms at least one positive principle, 
namely the weakness of the human mind. 
* * * 
 Thus, the origins of Huet’s skepticism lay in three phenomena. First, his quest for 
a universal proof of the Christian religion and his encounter with a large variety of 
ancient and modern texts opened Huet’s mind to conflicting opinions, which forced him 
to reconsider his own beliefs. Second, Huet’s disillusionment with his Aristotelian 
education in philosophy led him to seek a new coherent philosophical framework, 
ultimately leading him to repudiate all dogmatic systems. Third, Huet’s devotion to 
Catholicism drove him to formulate his skepticism in a way that best supported his own 
view of the relationship between faith and reason. Thus, the three causes of Huet’s 
skepticism seem to spring from the traditional educational system in which Huet matured 
as a scholar.  
Huet’s skepticism was not a radical rebellion against the established intellectual 
order, but an attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies he encountered in the course of his 
intellectual development. Huet was an orthodox Catholic who attempted to maintain 
intellectual integrity in a world where the incorporation of both rediscovered and new 
texts presented dramatic challenges to traditional intellectual authorities. Thus, Huet’s 
reaction sheds light on the tensions that existed between the aims of humanist scholarship 
and Biblical exegesis, and between philosophical and theological claims to truth in 
seventeenth-century France. We will address the latter issue more closely in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 2: The Cartesian Context: Huet’s Critique of the Presumption of Reason 
 
René Descartes exercised the single most important contemporaneous intellectual 
influence on Pierre-Daniel Huet. The nature of this influence was primarily negative, in 
so far as it led Huet to develop a philosophy with its deepest foundations in anti-
Cartesianism. His disdain for Cartesianism, exhibited most explicitly in the Censura 
philosophiae cartesianae and in the Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du 
Cartesianisme, was also present in implicit forms in the Demonstratio Evangelica, the 
Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, and in the Traité philosophique de 
la faiblesse de l'esprit humain. Because Descartes figured so prominently in all of Huet’s 
philosophical works, this chapter will investigate, in the context of the seventeenth-
century phenomena, the philosophical origins of Huet’s critique of Descartes.  
Three main contemporary interpretations of Huet’s skepticism attempt to address 
his combination of skepticism and anti-Cartesianism. The first interpretation, advanced 
by Christian Bartholmèss and Thomas Lennon, argues that Huet’s fideistic skepticism 
was an intellectual position developed as a reaction to the rationalist confidence and the 
intellectual arrogance of the Cartesian philosophy. These scholars argue that Huet was 
not a sincere skeptic, but rather employed skeptical arguments as a method to defeat the 
philosophical positions of Descartes and his followers. The second explanation, advanced 
by Richard Popkin, suggests that Huet’s skepticism preceded and served as the primary 
motivation for his anti-Cartesianism, thereby defining the essential arguments against 
Descartes. The third interpretation, offered by Alan Charles Kors, claims that while Huet 
was a sincere skeptic by the time he wrote the Traité, his skepticism arose as a reaction to 
the interminable theological debates between Cartesians and Aristotelians.  
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In opposition to these interpretations, Huet’s actual intellectual development, 
discussed in the previous chapter, reveals that Huet’s commitment to skepticism and his 
disdain for the Cartesian philosophy emerged almost simultaneously. While modern 
interpretations provide plausible explanations of Huet’s intellectual positions, all of them 
envisage Huet distinctly either as a skeptic or as an anti-Cartesian, without adequately 
considering the possibility that both philosophical positions developed simultaneously, 
and, consequently, depended on and contributed to each other.  
Huet’s skepticism was both the cause and the result of his anti-Cartesianism. It is 
a cause to the extent that Huet’s view of the human mind and of the human condition was 
entirely incompatible with the Cartesian confidence in the powers of human reason. It is 
clear that Huet considered himself a skeptic by 1660, while he formulated a treatise 
against Descartes in 1666.1 However, Huet’s skepticism was further informed by his 
crusade against Cartesianism. Huet perceived in Descartes a threat to the established 
philosophical and theological order, and he turned to skeptical arguments to defeat that 
threat. In using skepticism as a weapon against the Cartesians, Huet came to adapt its 
tenets in a way that could most effectively serve his purposes. Thus, while Huet’s 
skepticism was directed at all dogmatic schools, it took specific issues with Cartesianism, 
which gave Huet’s thought a truly unique nature.  
This chapter will present the most essential disagreements between Huet’s and 
Descartes’s epistemological systems, in order to explain the intellectual stakes of the 
debate. It will then consider Huet’s published and unpublished reactions to Cartesian 
thought and compare his implicit skeptical arguments in works prior to the Traité to the 
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skeptical formulations of the Traité itself. Three elements of Huet’s critique will receive 
particular attention: his assessment of Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt; his refutation of the 
proposition Cogito ergo sum; and his view of the impossibility of establishing criteria of 
truth. This chapter will then consider Huet’s reaction to Nicholas Malebranche (1638-
1715), whom he perceived as one of the main disciples of Descartes. Finally, it will 
evaluate contemporary historical interpretations of the relationship between Huet’s anti-
Cartesianism and skepticism. Ultimately, this chapter will demonstrate that anti-
Cartesianism and skepticism in Huet’s philosophy are inseparable elements in the 
formation of his thought. 
           * * * 
The most basic point of disagreement between Huet and Descartes arose in the 
epistemological contest between empiricism and rationalism. This divergence is crucial 
because it led the authors to conclusions about the powers of human reason that 
ultimately define Huet as a skeptic and Descartes as a dogmatist. While Descartes 
opposed the Aristotelian reliance on a posteriori reason and wanted to formulate an 
epistemology based on a priori rationalism, Huet accepted the Aristotelian reliance on 
empiricism. At the same time, Huet’s empirical epistemology was tainted by an 
Augustinian view of fallen human nature, leading him to reject human ability to gain true 
and certain knowledge about the real world.  
Although Augustinian philosophy is usually associated with a pessimistic view of 
the limits of natural knowledge and natural theology, it also widely appealed to the 
Cartesians who were drawn to and reinforced by its critique of sensory knowledge. The 
Cartesians maintained that pure intuitive reason, unhindered by the senses, remained a 
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guide to truth. Consequently, they attempted to discover the basic metaphysical truths by 
reason alone, without appealing to the fallen, bodily senses.2 Thus, the Cartesians 
adapted Augustine’s distrust of the senses to give authority to their own rationalist 
epistemology.  
Descartes’s first proof of God was the most obvious manifestation of an a priori 
argument in his philosophy:  
Again, the idea that enables me to understand a supreme deity, eternal, infinite, 
omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things other than himself, clearly has more 
objective reality within it than do those ideas through which the finite substances are 
displayed.3  
 
The Cartesian principle of objective reality stipulated that the existence of clear and 
distinct ideas of God and of substance in the mind necessitated their existence in the 
realm of objective reality. Descartes claimed that all human beings had a clear and 
distinct idea of God, defined as an infinite, perfect being. Since human mind was not 
infinite, it could not have autonomously formed an idea of an infinite being. Descartes 
concluded that an infinite being was the necessary source of this idea.4 In the second 
proof, he proposed that existence could “no more be separated from God’s essence 
than…the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of a mountain.”5 Thus, 
Descartes’s proofs of God operated outside of an empirical framework, relying entirely 
on the idea of God to demonstrate His necessary existence.  
In the Traité, Huet claimed that Descartes had proposed three sources of ideas: 
ideas formed by sense experience; ideas formed in us; and innate ideas, among which are 
                                                 
2 Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1650-1729 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 300; and 
Henri Gouhier, Cartésianisme et Augustinisme au XVIIe Siècle, (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 
1978), 10. 
3 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald Cress, (Indianapolis, Cambdridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 28. 
4 Ibid., 31. 
5 Ibid., 44. 
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the idea of God, ideas of geometrical principles, and ideas of essences.6 However, Huet 
sharply disagreed and claimed that if one carefully considered the nature of the human 
mind, one “will find no Idea therein that was not formed upon the Species of external 
Objects.”7 Huet affected the rare combination of a Thomistic view of epistemology and 
an Augustinian pessimism regarding the human inability to arrive at certain knowledge of 
the external world. Although Huet’s empiricism, as previously shown, should be 
attributed to his embrace of Epicureanism rather than to his scholastic education, he was, 
nevertheless, on the scholastic side of the debate. At the same time, Huet’s logical 
conclusions did not match those of the Aristotelian Scholastics. While most scholastics 
maintained a confidence in human reason despite the limits of empirical observation, 
Huet’s empiricism led him to reject systematically the possibility of human certainty.  
For Huet, as evident in the Traité, this impossibility followed from the nature of 
the human mind. He argued that the human mind was “a Principle, or Power born in Man, 
moved or excited to form Ideas, and Thoughts, the Reception and Impression of Species 
in the Brain.”8 He further defined the truth of judgment as the “agreement between the 
Idea that is in us,” and “the external Object which is the Origin of that Idea.”9 However, 
since human beings could gain knowledge of the external object only through the 
medium of the idea, they could never know the actual nature of the external object. 
Consequently, it was impossible for man to verify if the idea and the object agree or 
correspond with each other. Since the existence of this agreement defined truth, in Huet’s 
view, it followed from the very definition of truth and from the epistemological limits of 
                                                 
6 Pierre-Daniel Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, trans. Edw. Combe, 
(London: printed for Matthew de Varenne, 1725), 151-152.  
7 Ibid., 154. 
8 Ibid., 3-4. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
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the fallen human mind that “man cannot know Truth with perfect certainty by the Aid of 
Reason.”10 Thus, by beginning with an epistemological foundation that most explicitly 
rejected a priori reason, Huet consistently arrived at the conclusion that most explicitly 
opposed the confidence in human reason proposed by Cartesian rationalism.  
There were further consequences of this epistemological position that led Huet to 
formulate skeptical arguments against both Cartesianism and dogmatism. While 
Descartes buttressed his a priori epistemology by stressing the independence of the 
human mind, Huet attempted to disprove this notion in his critique of the Cartesian 
philosophy. Descartes perceived the mind to be of prior epistemological and logical 
importance to the body. Thus, in the Meditations, Descartes was careful to specify that 
the mind, not the body, was the first agent aware of its own existence. Having subjected 
the very existence of the body to doubt, Descartes postulated, “I am therefore precisely 
nothing but a thinking thing.” 11 Huet, on the other hand, defended the inseparability of 
the physical and non-physical aspects of thought. In the Censura, Huet designated an 
Epicurean interlocutor to press the Cartesian system on this point. The Epicurean argued 
that immaterial thought is an absurd concept, because without the body thought would 
not exist.12 This discussion did not serve to advance any particular dogmatic assertions, 
but rather formulated a critique of Descartes’s view of an incorporeal mind. 
The appropriation of patristic thought remained an important element in 
philosophical and theological debates of the seventeenth century. Thus, Huet 
meticulously sought to undermine the Augustinian foundations of Cartesian epistemology:  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Descartes, Meditations, 19. 
12 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy [Censura philosophiae Cartesianae], ed., trans. 
Thomas M. Lennon, (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), 138-139. 
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This and nothing else was meant by Augustine when he said that it is not the body that 
senses, but the soul by means of the body, meaning thereby in the way that a messengers 
forms in himself the message that he receives from elsewhere…since there is true vision 
when the body sees while the mind is distracted, and no vision when the mind sees while 
the body does not, it is evident that the body senses, not the soul.13  
 
Huet’s critique implied that Descartes was not only incorrect in the formulations of his 
epistemology and his view of the mind, but that he also misused Augustinian doctrines. 
By interpreting Augustine on knowledge in a way that supported an empirical 
epistemology, Huet tried to invalidate doubly the Cartesian view of immaterial thought. 
In the Traité, Huet presented further arguments to support the materiality of 
thought. He attempted to dispute the Cartesian notion that reason is immaterial, claiming, 
“’Tis a Maxim of the Philosopher Parmenides, that the Disposition of Man’s 
Understanding depends on the Disposition of the parts of the Body.”14 While in this 
instance Huet may appear to be a dogmatist, his arguments are of a purely critical nature. 
He did not seek to impose his own epistemological or ontological framework, but 
advanced claims that undermined Cartesian arguments. 
However, the discussion of the corporeality of thought in the Traité moved 
beyond criticism and formulated explicitly skeptical conclusions. Huet did this by 
presenting the logical and physical consequences of the material nature of human thought. 
There were two particular proofs in the Traité that appealed to the materiality of thought 
in a way that undermined the confidence in the powers of human reason. In discussing 
the unreliability of the senses in his second proof, Huet suggested that physical 
differences in the brain, physical agitations of the body, and age were among factors that 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 146-147. 
14 Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, 31. 
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crucially affected human thought and human perception.15 Consequently, it was possible 
for the same person to perceive the external world differently depending on that person’s 
physical condition. This argument strongly undermined the Cartesian reliance on reason 
as the criterion of certainty, suggesting that individual reason was not a suitable criterion 
of truth, given its mutability and its dependence on physical conditions.16  
Similarly, the fifth proof regarding the weakness of human understanding 
suggested that “things cannot be known with perfect certainty” because there is a great 
difference in the perception from person to person.17 For instance, colors, shapes, and 
sizes may all appear different to different men. If all knowledge were founded on sensory 
experience and individual perception, there could be no objective standard by which the 
truth and certainty of knowledge could be judged. Thus, Huet quoted Euripides to 
conclude that “amongst Men Nothing is equal, nor alike, except the Names of things, but 
that Things themselves have Nothing in them permanent nor sure.”18 Once again, Huet 
attacked the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct ideas, suggesting that ideas depended 
entirely on the subjective perception and the reason of individuals. In a world of 
subjective differences, no perspective could accurately claim to conceive of an objective 
reality. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 30-32. 
16 Incidentally, John Locke, who argued against the possibility of attaining ontological certainty, advanced 
a particularly controversial argument in favor of the materiality of thought. In 4.3.6 of his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Locke suggested that arguing against the possibility of thinking 
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proposition led to debates not only in Britain, but in France as well, where a number of learned journals 
such as the Bibliothèque choisie, Bibliothèque raisonnée, Bibliothèque britannique, and Journal de Trévoux. 
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philosophical, but theological, as they concerned the nature of the human soul and mind. For a further 
discussion of this topic see Yolton, John W., Locke and French Materialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991.) and Yolton, John W., Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: 
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Both of these arguments in the Traité went far beyond critiques of Cartesian 
philosophy. Huet sought to not only undermine the Cartesian confidence in the powers of 
the mind, but to demonstrate that all dogmatic systems failed to overcome the inherent 
weaknesses of the human mind. Thus, he built on his arguments regarding the materiality 
of thought in the Censura and drew skeptical conclusions that were not visible in his 
earlier works. However, the evolution of Huet’s expression of skeptical arguments did 
not always follow this pattern, and some of Huet’s most significant skeptical assertions 
surfaced much earlier than would be expected from most historical commentary. 
Huet’s specific rejection of the Cartesian criterion of truth and his repudiation of 
all criteria both followed from his epistemology. The inspection and rejection of 
Descartes’s criterion in the Censura clearly foreshadowed the conclusion of the Traité, 
where Huet claimed that God denied “a certain Rule of Truth” to human nature.19 In the 
Censura, Huet began by disparaging Descartes for both ambiguity in defining the 
criterion of truth and inconsistency in abiding by that criterion. For instance, Huet 
maintained that Descartes used the term “idea” not only to denote the images imprinted in 
our minds, but also to describe the operations of the mind, such as comparison and 
judgment.20 At times, Descartes called upon the existence of clear and distinct ideas to 
provide certainty, but at other points he used the natural light as the criterion of judgment.  
For Huet, the first criterion was easily called into question because not all true 
ideas were equally clear and distinct. Similarly, some false ideas could appear to be clear 
and distinct.21 Consequently, the clarity of the idea could not guarantee its truth. Huet 
also questioned the actual application of clear and distinct ideas. He suggested that from 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 49. 
20 BN Ms. Fr., 14702, fol. 16 verso. 
21 Ibid. 
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the existence of disagreements among Cartesians, who all presumably appealed to the 
same criterion of truth, it followed that:  
Either they perceive something clearly and distinctly that is false, from which it follows 
that clear and distinct perception is not a sure criterion of truth, or they do not adhere to 
this standard in examining their views, and thus they do not take it to be a sure and 
necessary standard.22  
 
Huet implicitly used the argument about differences in perception that exist even among 
Cartesians to attack the Cartesian notion of objective truth. Indeed, if the formulation of 
clear and distinct ideas guaranteed the truth, there would be no disagreement among those 
who follow this criterion. Huet similarly ridiculed the natural light as a criterion of truth 
by proposing the difficulty of distinguishing natural light, “the faculty of knowing given 
to us by God,” from non-natural light.23 In Huet’s final analysis, clear and distinct ideas 
as well as the natural light were inadequate criteria of truth because they were both 
capable of deceiving the human mind. 
Huet also questioned the very possibility of the existence of adequate criteria of 
truth:  
If every truth, whether known through itself or through something else, must be signified 
by a character of truth distinguishing it from falsity, this character itself is also a truth that 
bears its own character of truth, that is, another truth, and so on to infinity.24  
 
This argument, voiced openly in the Censura and essentially taken from Sextus 
Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, presented the fundamental skeptical rejection of all 
criteria of truth. The phrasing of the argument in the Censura is almost identical to the 
text in the Traité: 
Since the Criterium is the Rule of Truth; we must have adjusted this Rule, and be assured 
that it is right, before we apply it to Truth…Now we know not how to adjust it, nor be 
assured it is right, if we have another Rule of Truth, which is certainly true, and which 
                                                 
22 Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy, 127. 
23 Ibid., 121-122. 
24 Ibid., 116. 
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may serve to rectify the first. This second to be well rectified, must be regulated on a 
third, and this third on a fourth, and so to Infinity.25  
 
Huet, far from being a hidden skeptic, openly advanced the tenets of skepticism as 
early as 1689. So, perhaps, the critics of Huet’s Traité who read the Censura should not 
have been taken aback by Huet’s skepticism. Although Huet carefully framed most of his 
skeptical arguments in the Censura so as to distance himself from the label of skeptic, in 
this particular case he overtly donned the skeptical hat. This instance also demonstrates 
the extent to which the Censura and Huet’s anti-Cartesianism influenced the formulation 
of his skepticism. 
Descartes’s and Huet’s respective epistemologies led the thinkers to adopt 
drastically contrasting conclusions about the powers of human reason. However, there 
was another crucial element that followed from the difference in epistemology. Descartes 
began his Meditations with a hyperbolic doubt, but came to the most certain conclusions 
about the existence of the external world. Huet, on the other hand, framed his skeptical 
arguments in a way that doubt became the ultimate end of his philosophy. In fact, Huet’s 
first chapter in the Censura attacked what he saw as Descartes’s fallacious use of 
hyperbolic doubt from several perspectives. 
Contemporaneous and contemporary interpretations of Cartesian doubt should be 
considered before Huet’s own criticisms can be discussed. While this thesis does not aim 
to discern the true nature of Cartesian doubt, it is useful to review the spectrum of 
interpretations and criticisms of this doubt in order to situate Huet’s own reactions to 
Descartes’s method. A number of thinkers in the seventeenth century scrutinized the 
authenticity of the Cartesian doubt and considered it to be a dialectical method of refuting 
                                                 
25 Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, 53. 
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the skeptics to arrive at certitude. Indeed, Descartes’s disciples sought to dispel any 
notion that Descartes was a real skeptic, describing his doubt as a provisionary method 
for dispelling prejudices to arrive at scientific truths.26 For instance, Pierre-Sylvain Regis 
(1637-1707) suggested that Descartes did not intend to speak of a true doubt.27 This 
interpretation is also defended by modern scholars like Popkin, who interprets 
Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt as a strategy to defeat skepticism on its own terms.28
Popkin suggests that while Descartes did not intend to appear as a skeptic, the 
effects of his arguments certainly advanced the skeptical cause.29 Indeed, philosophers 
such as Jacobus Guilielmus Feverlinus (1689-1766) chastised Descartes for being the 
moral cause of atheism and skepticism due to the inadequacy of his method.30 Others 
went further and claimed that Cartesian doubt was an explicit profession of skepticism. 
Historian Carlo Borghero argues that the hyperbolic doubt proposed by Descartes went 
far beyond any skeptical arguments by denying the testimony of the senses, stressing the 
uncertainty of mathematics, and advancing the hypothesis of God-the-deceiver.  
Revealingly, Huet’s own reaction to the hyperbolic doubt advanced in the 
Meditations does not fall within these categories. Huet neither thought that Descartes 
feigned doubt nor perceived Descartes’s involuntary support for skepticism. Instead, Huet 
believed that Descartes started out as a skeptic, but later created a fallacious dogmatic 
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system.31 Huet’s manuscript of the Censura reveals his surprise at Descartes’s emergence 
from the state of hyperbolic doubt: 
All of a sudden, this irresolute man, who wants one to doubt all things, changes in an 
instant and, without telling us that he is sure that God or some evil genie does not deceive 
us, he affirms with full confidence that he thinks that he exists. One more time I would 
like to know how this man, who does not know if God, in creating him, did not subject 
him to a world of perpetual illusions, [how this man] can be assured that he does not 
make a mistake when he believes that he is, that he thinks, that there are contradictory 
things.32
 
To Huet, Descartes’s leap from complete uncertainty to full confidence seemed entirely 
inconsistent with the latter’s earlier doubts. How could someone who a moment ago was 
contemplating whether God was a deceiver, all of a sudden gain such certainty in the 
truth of his own thoughts? Huet considered this to be an erroneous logical leap, as 
Descartes “breaks faith and promise by assuming as true what is no less doubtful than 
other things that he considered to be treatable as false.”33 Essentially, Huet claimed that 
Descartes did not adequately escape the skeptical framework that he created at the outset 
of his Meditations. 
Descartes’s essential problem, for Huet, was in the principle Cogito ergo sum that 
lay the foundation of all Cartesian philosophy. After subjecting all acquired knowledge to 
doubt and distrusting all of his senses, the meditating voice of Descartes concludes that 
because he was able to persuade himself of the inexistence of the world within his 
meditation, he must exist since he is aware of the persuasion. When all else in the 
surrounding world is gone, including the body, thought continues to exist. Therefore, 
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thought and an agent that thinks [a thinking thing] must exist. Descartes is aware of his 
thinking process, and by virtue of that awareness he concludes that he exists.34 Thus, for 
Descartes, both the awareness of one’s own existence and the reflection upon that 
existence guarantee that existence. 
 For Huet, the most significant fault of the Cogito ergo sum principle was that it 
engaged in circular reasoning. “This argument reduces to that of Chrysippus…If I exist, I 
exist; or, I am, therefore I am. I thereby assume that I am in order to prove that I am, and 
I argue in a vicious circle.”35 Descartes’s use of “I” in the clause “I am a thinking thing” 
already implies existence of the subject. Huet argued that the proposition “I exist” does 
not follow from the premise “I am a thinking thing.”36 Thinking in no way implies 
existence, if existence itself is subjected to doubt. Thus, Huet blamed Descartes for 
engaging in circular reasoning because Descartes assumed that he exists in order to prove 
that he exists. 
Furthermore, the very grammar of Descartes’s proposition made no logical sense 
to Huet, who distinguished between three things in considering the proposition “I am 
thinking:” the mind that is thinking, the action of thinking, and the object of the 
thought.37 In his manuscript of the Censura, Huet proposed to subject the proposition “I 
am thinking, therefore I am” to such a division into parts: 
When he states “I think,” what is the object of which his mind thinks? It could only be his 
thought. Yet, this thought about which he reflects, is not the one which he forms in 
thinking of it;…One must say: “I think that I was thinking,” since our mind cannot think 
of more than one object [in a given moment], any more than our eyes can perceive more 
than one thing at a time. This is why when I think that I think, this necessarily supposes 
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two thoughts, where one reflects on the other, the latter [thought reflects] on the former 
one, the present [thought reflects] on the past one.38
 
Huet deconstructed Descartes’s ambiguous use of “I am thinking” in order to show that 
even if thought did guarantee existence, it could not do so without reference to the past. 
Such a reference to the past, however, destroyed the momentous realization of one’s 
existence on which the Cogito principle depended. Aiming for the jugular, Huet sought to 
destroy the principle on which Cartesian doubt was abandoned and to plunge the 
Cartesians back into their own net of uncertainty. 
Nor did Huet wish to entertain seriously the Cartesian claim that Descartes only 
feigned his doubt:  
I respond that what Descartes thought about his existence is not an issue between us, but 
rather whether he undertook to question and prove his existence, and whether, having 
done so, he satisfactorily did so through argument and reasoning.39
 
Huet explicitly refused to speculate about the sincerity of Cartesian doubt. Instead, he 
wished to demonstrate that the leap from skepticism to dogmatism was inadequately 
justified, because “if our existence were known to us by itself why were Democritus and 
the Academics in doubt about their own?”40 Thus, Huet argued that whether or not 
Descartes’s doubt about his own existence was feigned or sincere, his departure from that 
doubt was not supported by adequate arguments.  
Huet’s frustration with Descartes becomes apparent when he writes, “But he 
[Descartes] left off doubting just when it was most necessary to doubt, namely, at a 
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principle that is no less uncertain than all the other that he subjected to doubt.”41 Huet 
added in his manuscript: “He [Descartes] does not begin to err until the moment when he 
separates himself from the skeptics.”42 While at the time of the publication of the 
Censura Huet did not hold the reputation of a skeptic, this lament certainly revealed his 
appreciation for the skeptical use of doubt.  
Later in the Censura, Huet entirely rejected the feign hypothesis and argued that 
for Descartes, doubt was authentically skeptical in its beginning stages:   
For when they [Cartesians] say that Descartes only feigned doubt but that the skeptics 
really doubted, I agree with the latter but find the former unsupported by any argument. 
For by what mark can the feigned doubt of Descartes be distinguished from the real doubt 
of the skeptics? The skeptics philosophize in the same way as does Descartes: they each 
search after truth, they each avoid error, they each think that error is avoided through 
doubt, which they each therefore advocate.43
 
Huet’s attitude supports Lennon’s interpretation. Huet really did consider that Descartes 
began his Meditations as a sincere skeptic and then committed an intellectually dishonest 
leap from doubt to certainty.44 Huet seemed to express a certain amount of enthusiasm 
for the similarity between Descartes and the skeptics, thereby revealing his own 
predilection for skeptical philosophy.  
At the same time, Huet argued that Descartes and the Cartesians inherently 
misunderstood the skeptics and their reasons for doubt. The skeptics, unlike Descartes, 
continued to suspend their judgment “because nothing seemed to them capable of being 
perceived with sufficient clarity or certainty.”45 Huet deflected the Cartesian accusation 
that all skeptics doubt simply in order to doubt, and explicitly offered the explanation 
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from Sextus Empiricus: “The Cartesians should indeed know that the ultimate goal of the 
skeptical philosophy is not doubt but tranquility in those things that depend on 
opinion.”46 In this statement, Huet both scolded the Cartesians for their ignorance of 
ancient philosophy and furtively defended the tenets of skepticism against 
misinterpretation. 
Huet expanded on the skeptical reasons for doubt in the Traité, suggesting that the 
suspension of judgment has both an immediate goal and a remote end. The former goal 
consisted in “avoiding Error, Obstinacy, and Arrogance.” The latter goal, in Huet’s 
fideistic view, prepared the mind for the “Reception of the divine Faith.”47 Huet’s 
fideism and the ultimate end of his skeptical doubt will be discussed further in the next 
chapter; here the immediate goals of doubt require closer scrutiny.  
 A typical skeptic would normally attribute the existence of inherent philosophical 
errors to any dogmatic system. Huet’s use of the words “obstinacy” and “arrogance,” on 
the other hand, seems to single out Cartesianism. While Huet clearly disagreed with 
Descartes’s conclusions, he also perceived the Cartesians as an arrogant and 
presumptuous sect.  
Huet’s most essential criticism is that “Descartes, caught in an obvious 
contradiction and inconsistency of views, abandons his previous doubt and, misusing its 
advantages to the benefit of his philosophy, he pretends to pretend.”48 For Huet, 
Descartes did not feign doubt, but rather pretended to pretend to doubt, and only feigned 
his escape from the hyperbolic doubt. Thus, Huet perceived that the entire Cartesian 
system was based on intellectual dishonesty, as it pretended to escape an inexorable state 
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of doubt. Huet recognized Cartesianism not only as dogmatism, but as a dogmatism that 
is aware of its inherent falsity: Descartes was conscious of the fact that his dogmatic 
system did not rest upon solid ground, yet he dissimulated this awareness by pretending 
to be entirely confident of the foundations of his philosophy. It is this perceived vanity, 
arrogance, and pretension in the philosophy of Descartes that most offended Huet. 
Huet perceived a duplicitous calculation in the feigned ignorance of Descartes. He 
dedicated the last part of his conclusion to the Censura to explaining this calculation. For 
Huet, Descartes falsely claimed to be unfamiliar with ancient philosophy in order to 
appear to his audience as a novel philosopher, while appropriating and disguising 
arguments from ancient philosophies. Huet identified the horrific consequence of this 
claim, arguing that Descartes’s disciples genuinely followed these principles and 
neglected both literature and philological scholarship, pursuits dear to Huet.49 Thus, he 
sought to deny his opponent any originality by meticulously pointing out each instance 
where Descartes appropriated previously formulated philosophical arguments. For 
instance, Huet claimed that the proposition of beginning all philosophy with doubt has 
been advanced by the skeptics, by Aristotle, and by Augustine. Similarly, the argument “I 
am thinking, therefore I exist” has been employed by Augustine in The City of God.50 
Huet thus argued that most of Descartes’s arguments have been essentially plagiarized 
and present no philosophical novelty. 
Although the Aristotelian Scholastics could just as easily be classified as 
dogmatists, there are several reasons why Huet did not attack them openly. First, many of 
Huet’s friends and colleagues happened to be Aristotelians. An open censure of 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 214-215. 
50 Ibid., 218. 
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Aristotelian Scholasticism would have entailed political suicide for Huet, ending his 
career. Thus, Descartes was the most convenient target. Second, although Aristotelian 
Scholasticism remained entrenched in the universities, Cartesianism continued to make a 
bold advance in French intellectual life. Third, Descartes’s belief in the existence of 
innate knowledge and his epistemological commitment to rationalism and to a priori 
reasoning made him the most obvious opponent. Fourth, the pretension Huet perceived in 
the confidence of the Cartesians made their sect a clear target for a philosopher 
attempting to defeat the presumption of the dogmatists.  
Nicholas Malebranche, who was the best-known disciple of the Cartesian school, 
received a similar reaction from Huet after publishing the De la recherche de la vérité 
(Concerning the Search after Truth) in 1674. Huet’s own copy of the work, available at 
the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, contains a page of comments on the inside of the 
cover. After giving the work cursory praise for its acuteness, discernment, reflection, and 
eloquence, Huet commenced an entire page of criticism: “But all of this is corrupted by 
excessive presumption, pride, and impudence.”51  
Lennon gives a great deal of attention to Huet’s reception of Malebranche’s work. 
In fact, he argues that the “pride, vanity, and arrogance” Huet perceived in Malebranche’s 
De la recherche de la Vérité gave birth to his anti-Cartesianism.52 Lennon claims that 
Huet employed skepticism as a tactic against Descartes and his followers. Lennon 
specifically refers to the “skeptical ridicule” of the Nouveaux mémoires, which he argues 
                                                 
51 Huet’s marginal note inside the front cover of Nicolas Malebranche, De la recherché de la vérité, (Paris, 
Chez Andre Pralard, 1674). « Mais tout cela est corrompu par trop de presomtion, de fierté & de 
hardiesse. » 
52 Lennon, “Huet, Malebranche and the Birth of Skepticism,” in The Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes 
and Descartes to Bayle, ed. Gianni Paganini, (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 154. 
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was written as a deserving response to the “pride, vanity, and arrogance” of Cartesian 
dogmatism.53
Lennon’s interpretation of “pride, vanity, and arrogance” is problematic because 
he believes that Huet was most deeply offended by the Cartesian ridicule and dismissal of 
all humanist disciplines, such as history, geography, philology. Consequently, Lennon 
argues that the production of Huet’s Censura was spurned by a bitter personal animosity 
towards the Cartesian disdain for the humanist tradition. In other words, the conflict 
between Huet and Descartes was an interdisciplinary quarrel, as the reputation and the 
relevance of entire intellectual fields are at stake. This interpretation is very similar to one 
advanced by nineteenth-century historian Christian Bartholmèss, who also argues that 
Huet was motivated by “the unjust disdain of that philosopher [Descartes] for memories, 
languages, traditions, for all that with which the historian occupies himself.”54 Like 
Lennon, Bartholmèss interprets Huet’s aversion to skepticism as a personal animosity and 
argues that skepticism was more of a means than an end for Huet.55
Although these arguments seem cogent, they exaggerate the importance of Huet’s 
personal animosity toward the Cartesian disdain for the humanities. Thus, the scholars 
suggest that Huet’s entire rejection of Cartesianism was motivated by interdisciplinary 
insults. Shelford, however, argues that Huet sought to settle the interdisciplinary quarrel 
as early as 1679, when he published the Demonstratio Evangelica. She suggests that in 
writing the work, Huet accepted the Cartesian challenge of providing demonstrative proof 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 159. 
54 Christian Bartholmèss, Huet évêque d’Avranches ou le scepticisme théologique, (Paris: Franck, 1850), 4. 
« l’injuste dédain de ce philosophe [Descartes] pour les souvenirs, les langues, les traditions, pour tout ce 
qui occupe l’historien. » 
55 Ibid., 117. 
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of the Christian religion and sought to equate demonstrative proofs with moral ones.56 In 
undertaking this challenge, Huet began by subjecting all geometric principles to intense 
scrutiny. This was a way of undermining Cartesian criteria by challenging a discipline 
that the Cartesians regarded as one that led to greatest certainty. Shelford claims that 
Huet’s critique of geometrical demonstrations and axioms for their lack of clarity in 
definitions of terms, such as line, point, and extension was modeled on Sextus Empiricus’ 
Against the Geometers.57 Having concluded this critique, Huet proceeded to provide a 
proof of the Christian religion employing a “geometrized” account of prophecies and 
their fulfillments.58
Ultimately, Huet aimed to show that historical or moral demonstrations contained 
as much certainty as geometrical ones, and that geometric definitions were not as clear as 
they appeared to be.59 In fact, Huet suggested that where the demonstration of the truth of 
the Christian religion was concerned, historical criteria based on divine Scripture were 
both clearer than and superior to geometric definitions in validating the truth of the 
Christian religion.60 Thus, Huet the humanist attempted to show that philology, Biblical 
exegesis, and history were far more relevant to interpreting the truth of the Scriptures 
than abstract metaphysical formulations. 
Such a rebuttal of both Descartes’s and Malebranche’s ridicule of the humanities 
seems like an adequate expression of the humanist bitterness toward the arrogance of the 
geometrizing Cartesians described by Lennon. Lennon correctly indicates that the 
Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Cartesianisme can be interpreted as a 
                                                 
56 Shelford, “Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica (1679),” 607. 
57 Ibid., 611. 
58 Ibid., 614. 
59 Ibid., 612. 
60 Huet, Demonstratio Evangelica, (Amsterdam: Janssonio-Waesbergios, 1680), 4. 
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ridicule in response to the “pride, arrogance, and vanity” of the Cartesian philosophy.61 
However, he goes further to suggest that Huet’s personal bitterness “gave birth to the 
Censura.”62  
Such an interpretation inherently exaggerates the role of Huet’s personal 
resentment against the Cartesians in the formation of the Censura. After all, the Censura 
is a deeply philosophical work that is addressed to learned audience, as it is first 
published in Latin. Huet engaged in meticulous refutations that involved arcane 
terminology and assumed that his audience was cognizant of the references to ancient 
philosophers. On the other hand, the Nouveaux mémoires was published solely in French 
and addressed a more popular audience, given its satirical genre. Thus, while the 
Demonstratio Evangelica defended the stature of the humanities among the learned 
audiences, the Nouveaux mémoires served as a popular ridicule of Cartesianism. Unlike 
these works, the Censura focused on presenting the main philosophical weaknesses of the 
Cartesian system and defeating the Cartesians in purely philosophical terms.  
Another problem with Lennon’s interpretation is its chronological inaccuracy. 
Lennon argues in two separate articles that Huet’s rejection of Cartesianism can be dated 
to 1674, when he read Malebranche’s Recherche for the first time.63 However, Huet’s 
correspondence indicates that he first contemplated composing a treatise against 
Cartesian philosophy as early as 1666.64 Furthermore, it has already been established that 
Huet’s interactions with Cormis and his subsequent commitment to skepticism took place 
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62 Ibid., 154. 
63 Ibid.; and Lennon, “Foucher, Huet, and the Downfall of Cartesianism,” in Cartesian Views: Papers 
presented to Richard A. Watson, ed. Lennon, (Boston: Brill, 2003), 121. 
64 BN Ms. Lat., 11432, fol. 143, Prid. Cal. Dec. 1666, Huet to Rapin. (Quoted and translated in Shelford, 
“Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica (1679),” 606). See the previous 
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around 1660.65 Thus, while Malebranche’s work may have further embittered Huet, his 
intellectual criticisms would have already been formulated.  
 By failing to date Huet’s intellectual commitment skepticism accurately, Lennon 
fails to acknowledge a progression in Huet’s increasingly explicit exposition of 
skepticism. In the Demonstratio Evangelica Huet modeled his refutation of geometric 
certainty on Sextus Empiricus, thereby subtly advancing a skeptical influence under the 
veil of humanism. By the time of the Censura, Huet’s skepticism became more apparent 
in the arguments about the criterion of truth and in the defense of the skeptical causes of 
doubt. The Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, which will be more 
extensively discussed in the following chapter, exposed the fideistic side of Huet’s 
skepticism. In this text, Huet sought to establish a hierarchy between faith and reason, 
whereby reason would become subjected to faith and would refrain from infringing upon 
its domain in all theological questions. While reason would maintain an autonomous 
ability to philosophize, its utility was deeply questioned. 
Bartholmèss’s and Lennon’s neglect of the correspondence also leads them to 
reject the sincerity of Huet’s skepticism. Bartholomèss refuses to acknowledge Huet as a 
skeptic, instead classifying Huet as a Christian dogmatist who employs skepticism to 
preserve the faith.66 Although Lennon’s interpretation is not so categorical, he does not 
accurately analyze the skepticism inherent in Huet’s critique of Descartes. By concluding 
his article on Malebranche and Huet with a cursory mention of Huet’s “skeptical 
ridicule” Lennon neglects to describe the process by which Huet’s aversion to 
                                                 
65 Bartholmèss, 51; and BN Ms. Lat., 11432, fol. 101-102 Huet to Mambrun, 16 November 1660. (Quoted 
and translated in Shelford, “Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica 
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Cartesianism drove him to formulate skeptical arguments.67 Bartholmèss goes deeper 
than Lennon in analyzing Huet’s skepticism as a tactic, claiming that skepticism’s main 
force was the negative dialectic that reduced all Cartesian arguments to absurdity.68 
However, by refusing to consider Huet as a sincere skeptic, Lennon and Bartholmèss 
seem to disregard the philosophical stakes of the argument between the skeptics and the 
Cartesians.  
Given the inadequacy of these interpretations, the combination of “pride, vanity, 
and arrogance” [“presumption, “pride,” and “impudence” are the words used by Huet] 
could be interpreted as a criticism that goes much deeper than personal animosity. Huet’s 
aversion to Descartes’s clever dissimulation of doubt certainly comes to mind. Consider 
the following part of the commentary:  
His meditations, instead of curing his prejudices and arming him against verisimilitudes 
according to his own precepts, made him take up extravagant visions, mad conjectures, 
and suppositions much more uncertain than those he fought against.69  
 
Unlike Descartes, Malebranche did not even attempt to suspend his judgment and remove 
his prejudices. However, in Huet’s view, Malebranche emulated Descartes in having 
constructed an absolutely false system based on the most uncertain principles. The 
obvious weakness of Malebranche’s and Descartes’s principles doubly offended Huet by 
combining presumption with the awareness of error. Both were, for Huet, authors of 
imaginary dogmatic systems that affronted reason by their obvious fallacies.  
Contrary to Lennon’s argument, Huet’s condemnation of Descartes and 
Malebranche went beyond personal animosity. Although Huet was offended by the 
                                                 
67 Lennon, “Huet, Malebranche and the Birth of Skepticism,” 159 and 154. 
68 Bartholmèss, 67. 
69 Huet’s marginal note inside the front cover of Nicolas Malebranche, De la recherché de la vérité, (Paris, 
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Cartesian ridicule of the humanities, it would seem strange that he would dedicate the 
Censura, the Nouveaux mémoires, the Traité, and arguably the Demonstratio Evangelica 
along with the Alnetanae quaestiones to repudiating Cartesian principles. Rather, his 
aversion to Cartesianism stemmed from deep theological and philosophical 
disagreements. 
Kors offers another interpretation of Huet’s anti-Cartesianism and skepticism. He 
gives particular attention to Huet’s early commitment to Cartesianism and offers the view 
that Huet’s “fall from Cartesian certainty began an odyssey that ended in fideism.”70 
Such an interpretation fails to acknowledge Huet’s early embrace of skepticism because it 
suggests that Huet rejected Cartesianism significantly before embracing skepticism. 
Although Kors’s interpretation does not accurately date Huet’s skepticism, it provides an 
original interpretation of the tension between reason and faith. Kors claims that Huet’s 
position was, in a way, an intellectual retreat from the ferocity of the religious debates of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.71 He suggests that while Huet was not 
initially averse to dogmatism, his participation in the endless sequence of proofs and 
disputations of proofs of the existence of God led him to reject the very possibility of 
rationally proving the existence of God. The appeal of fideistic skepticism lay in its 
ability to peacefully resolve the disputes about the existence of God without an engaging 
in an inexorable cycle of proofs, objections, and objections to objections, ad infinitum.  
Although Bartholmèss does not qualify Huet as a skeptic, he nevertheless 
perceives the seemingly logical progression from Huet’s earlier works to the Traité. He 
suggests that Huet’s skeptical oeuvre was nothing but an extreme consequence and frank 
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application of explicit and implicit principles, proposed in his earlier works.72 He sees 
great similarity between the structure, the narrative frame, and the arguments of the 
Alnetanae quaestiones and the Traité. Bartholmèss points out that in both works Huet 
aimed to destabilize reliance on reason as a means to certitude. He argues that the 
common goal of both works was to preserve the faith and the revealed dogma by 
reducing the human reliance of reason, thereby rendering Christian dogma the only 
source of certainty.73  
In describing the consequences of the Cartesian philosophical revolution, Popkin 
argues that the “application of Cartesian methodology and the Cartesian standard of true 
philosophical and scientific knowledge to the evaluation of religious knowledge” was 
perhaps the major factor in the development of irreligion in the seventeenth century.74 He 
then describes a subsequent rejection of the Cartesian principles by those who wished to 
preserve Biblical texts from being evaluated by the Cartesian standards. Huet’s 
categorical rejection of Descartes’s rationalist methods and aims certainly seems to fit 
this description.   
Consider Huet’s own view of how Descartes’s intellectual presumption enervated 
religious authority:  
Descartes yet had such confidence in his views that he declared that nothing should be 
accepted as true that was not clearer and more certain that the demonstrations of 
geometers, that his views were so evident and certain that they would, if properly 
understood, remove all ground for dispute, and finally that the things of nature could 
spring from no other causes than those proposed by him…And this presumptuousness of 
Descartes has led the Cartesians into such unbridled and precipitate temerity that no one 
from this grandiloquent sect blushes to write that whatever they know must be true.75
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Descartes and the Cartesians represented, for Huet, the ultimate expression of dogmatism 
in his age. The confidence with which Descartes advanced his views deified him and 
rendered him an infallible authority in all matters philosophical and theological. In fact, 
Descartes had such audacity that “he dared to compare the truth of his opinions with the 
truth of the dogmas of the faith, asserting that they necessarily agree with each other, and 
that those argued for by him in philosophy cannot be contrary to those of theology unless 
theology contradicts the light of reason.”76 Thus, for Huet, Descartes not only presented 
an erroneous doctrine, but had the impudence to compare its certainty to divine sources 
of knowledge. 
 This comment is crucial because it clearly reveals Huet’s own perception of the 
stakes of the debate. If Descartes were able to erect a philosophical system that dictated 
certain knowledge claiming that the intellectual certainty of his principles are equivalent 
to those of divine revelation, then he would inherently undermine the principles of the 
faith. Huet took all human certainty to be far below the level of divine certainty.77 Thus, 
even if human certainty were attainable by reason, it would only faintly resemble divine 
truth and would most certainly never contradict it.78 To suggest, as Descartes does, that 
the relationship was reversed, that the principles of divine theology should be subjected 
to the standard of human reason was pure and simple heresy, in Huet’s view. 
* * * 
 Herein lies the birth of Huet’s skepticism. Huet was able to perceive the withering 
away of established philosophical and theological authorities in light of fierce intellectual 
debates. These debates inherently enervated the intellectual stability that has so far been 
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provided by incontestable intellectual authorities. Perhaps Huet was able to foresee the 
irreparable damage that philosophical and theological contests for intellectual authority 
would bring to the stability of religious traditions in the Enlightenment. Thus, Huet’s aim 
was to defend the faith against the onslaught of rational critiques of revealed truths. The 
strategy consisted in defeating the intellectual confidence of dogmatists like Descartes by 
stressing the fallibility of human reason. 
As will be shown in the following chapter, Huet’s fideism was responsible for the 
formation of his philosophical skepticism. In arguing that skeptical philosophy was most 
effective in leading people to agree to the truths of Christianity, Huet revealed his 
understanding of the potential danger of submitting revealed truths to the undiscerning 
examination of reason. When faced with the extreme dogmatism of Descartes, Huet had 
to undermine the rationalist effort. Consequently, he began to formulate a more refined 
version of skepticism that combined a pessimistic view of the abilities of human 
understanding with an unshakeable faith in the truth of the Christian doctrine. Thus, 
while the rejection of Cartesian principles may not be the root cause of Huet’s skepticism, 
the audacity he perceived in Descartes and his disciples certainly radicalized Huet’s own 
perspectives. 
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Chapter 3: “It Is Certain Because It Is Impossible” 
 
 Having considered Pierre-Daniel Huet’s biographical and philosophical 
motivations for adopting philosophical skepticism, the thesis will now turn to the 
religious dimension of Huet’s thought, which, as will be demonstrated, was the most 
crucial factor in the formation of his skepticism. Huet’s skepticism developed as a 
defense against the rationalist revolution of his age that threatened to challenge all 
supernatural theological doctrines with an indiscriminate appeal to naturalistic logical 
explanations. Consequently, Huet denounced the powers of reason and argued that the 
human mind was weak in order to convince his audience that there was only one source 
of true and certain knowledge: faith in supernatural revelation. Huet’s skepticism was, 
above all, religious in its nature and purpose. While this may seem an idiosyncratic 
position, Huet’s skeptical fideism was, in fact, neither singular nor surprising, and, in 
context, Huet’s seemingly contradictory positions, from critic of Descartes to the author 
of the Traité, were essentially consistent.  
 To demonstrate this consistency and continuity, this chapter will show how 
Huet’s Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei presents the logical link 
between his anti-Cartesianism and his skepticism. While the Censura explicitly refuted 
the tenets of one particular philosophical system, it implicitly denounced the presumption 
of reason. The Quaestiones, in turn, relegated reason to a concomitant position with 
respect to faith. Finally, the Traité struck the lethal blow to the foundations of reason, 
demonstrating its utter inability to know anything with certainty. 
* * * 
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To understand the context in which the fideistic movement became appealing in 
seventeenth-century France, we must look back a century and a half to the Lateran 
Council of 1513. Prior to this council, some of the major axioms of Christianity, such as 
the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, were considered as preambles to, 
rather than articles of, the faith. A group of Italian philosophers, known as the Paduan 
Averroists, claimed that neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul 
could be demonstrated by natural human reason; for them, faith was the sole source of 
such knowledge.1 The arguments at stake concerned neither the actual existence of God 
nor the immortality of the soul, but rather the human ability to know such things with 
certainty by the use of natural reason.  
In response to such potentially dangerous claims, the Fifth Lateran Council 
declared the existence of God and the immortality of the soul to be naturally 
demonstrable, which made it an article of the faith that such natural demonstrations were 
compelling. The fifth session of the Council, in effect, made fideism on such issues 
heretical: 
And since truth cannot contradict truth, we define that every statement contrary to the 
enlightened truth of the faith is totally false and we strictly forbid teaching otherwise to 
be permitted. We decree that all those who cling to erroneous statements of this kind, 
thus sowing heresies which are wholly condemned, should be avoided in every way and 
punished as detestable and odious heretics and infidels who are undermining the catholic 
faith.2
 
                                                 
1 The Latin term “quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest, sed sola fide tenetur.” For more on the Paduan 
Averroists, see Paul Friedrich Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Rennaissance, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopikins University Press, 2004), 286. 
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The Council further restricted philosophers from deviating in any way “from the true 
faith” in any principles or conclusions they present to the public. Furthermore, all 
philosophers were obligated to “devote their every effort to clarify for their listeners the 
truth of the Christian religion.”3 Finally, the Council sought to undermine future 
challenges to the authority of the Church, by limiting the study of philosophy to five 
years and allowing scholars to pursue further study of philosophy only if they 
simultaneously studied theology.  
The intention of this decision was to prevent any possible challenges to the 
orthodox positions of the Catholic Church. While the Council intended to reduce the 
controversy and debates surrounding the articles of Christianity, its decrees inadvertently 
generated an increasingly heated series of debates. For if the existence of God were 
demonstrable by natural human reason, then there could be “no greater task in philosophy 
than assiduously to seek out, once for all, the best of all these arguments and to lay them 
out so precisely and plainly that, henceforth all will take them to be true and precise 
demonstrations.”4
 This latter passage is taken from René Descartes’s letter to the Faculty of 
Theology in Paris more than a century later. Written as a dedication to his Meditations, 
this letter identified the unintended consequences of the Lateran Council. If philosophers 
could not dispute the veracity of Church doctrines, they would debate the best ways of 
demonstrating the accuracy of those doctrines.  
 Thus, the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France was plunged into an 
inexorable series of debates about and demonstrations of the existence of God. The 
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Aristotelian Scholastics, who generally referred to St. Thomas Aquinas’s five traditional 
proofs, stood on one side of the debate. The first proof, from motion, claimed that the 
existence of motion in the universe indicated the necessary existence of a First Mover. 
The second proof claimed that the “sequence of dependent cause and effect” in the 
surrounding world, necessitated the existence of a First Cause. The third proof argued 
that the contingency of all living things required the existence of a Necessary Being. The 
fourth proof, from degrees of perfection, advanced that from the degrees of perfection in 
finite things, the existence of a Supremely Perfect being could be inferred. Finally, the 
fifth proof argued that the order and harmony of the world demonstrated the existence of 
a Benevolent and Providential Being, who governed the world.5
 All of the Aristotelian proofs in their Thomistic form applied to a posteriori 
demonstration, since they relied on observations about the external world and from these 
observations inferred the existence of God. Thus, the Aristotelian Scholastics were 
committed to an empirical epistemology, believing that “nothing entered the mind except 
by way of the senses.”6 The Cartesian proofs stood in direct opposition to and challenged 
the Scholastic epistemology, attempting to demonstrate the existence of God a priori, 
without reference to evidence beyond the mind itself.  
 Descartes based his first proof of God on the fact that he possessed a clear and 
distinct idea of a “supreme deity, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of 
all things.”7 He argued that an idea of an infinite being had to possess more objective 
reality than ideas of finite substances. There could not be more objective being in an idea 
                                                 
5 For a more thorough discussion, see Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1650-1729 (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), 298-299. 
6 Ibid., 299. 
7 Descartes, Meditations, 27-28. 
 75
than in its cause. “Hence it follows that something cannot come into being out of nothing, 
and also that what is more perfect…cannot come into being from what is less perfect.”8 
Since the idea of God was infinite, but man’s mind merely finite, Descartes concluded 
that there could be no other source of the idea of God than “a certain substance that is 
infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me 
along with everything else that exists.”9 Descartes’s first proof God was entirely a priori, 
since it did not refer to any empirical evidence outside the mind. Consequently, this 
knowledge was, according to Descartes, innate in all human beings.10
 Descartes’s second proof relied on his view of the nature of ideas. If one could 
form a clear and distinct idea of something in the mind, it followed that one could clearly 
and distinctly perceive all the things that belonged to that idea. For instance, one could 
only conceive of a unicorn as having one horn and of a triangle as having three angles. 
Since the idea of God was of a supremely perfect being, He must have all the attributes of 
perfection, including necessary existence. Descartes claimed that if the property of 
existence were removed from the idea of God, then He would no longer be perfect. Thus, 
“from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is 
inseparable from God, and for this reason he really exists.”11 The non-existence of a 
perfect being was a logical impossibility, a self-contradiction.  
 For the Cartesians, Descartes’s proofs were convincing because they did not rely 
on man’s feeble senses, but, rather, deduced the existence of God from first principles.12 
The Scholastics, on the other hand, considered Cartesian proofs as “dangerous for their 
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weakness” and argued that Descartes had relied on misguided epistemological methods.13 
Both philosophical schools continued to devise their own demonstrations, while refuting 
their opponents. What was at stake was not so much the existence of God as the battle for 
supremacy in the learned world. A philosophical system’s ability to demonstrate 
irrefutably the existence of God would ensure its superiority in the intellectual world of 
seventeenth-century France. Ironically, each school’s inability to present a conclusive 
proof coupled with an unwillingness to surrender to its opponents perpetuated debates 
regarding the existence of God into the eighteenth century, compounding refutation upon 
refutation, objection upon objection. 
 Huet’s Censura presents one such set of refutations of Descartes’s two proofs of 
God. In the manuscript version of the Censura, Huet wrote that he planned to “examine 
Descartes’ argument, or to better say, joke, concerning the existence of God.”14 Huet’s 
refutation identified Descartes’s proof as insincere, but treated the Cartesian argument 
with full philosophical seriousness.  
 Having summarized Descartes’s two proofs, Huet addressed his opponent’s view 
of the idea of an infinite and supremely perfect being: “For, if this idea is not of a 
different nature than our other ideas, its source cannot be necessarily attributed to an 
infinite and supremely perfect cause.”15 Consequently, Huet argued that Descartes’s use 
of the term “idea” was ambiguous, because it could refer both to the action of the 
thinking mind and to the object of a thought. Furthermore, he claimed that “our idea of an 
infinite and supremely perfect being, is itself finite and imperfect” although “Descartes 
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15 Ibid., fol. 28 verso. « Car si elle n’est pas d’une autre nature que nos autres idées il n’est point du tout 
necessaire de remonter a une cause infinie & souverainement parfaite. » 
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would have us believe that this idea is so excellent and elevated that it not only far 
surpasses the perfection of our soul, but that it could only be derived from God.”16 For 
Huet, Descartes was inconsistent in attributing reliability to the human idea of infinity. 
Descartes, in his critic’s view, defeated his own argument by suggesting that man can 
only conceive of infinity “negatively” (knowing what it is not), but not “positively” 
(knowing what it is). Huet argued that such reasoning showed that our idea of God was 
clearly finite and, thus, could not serve as the basis for the alleged Cartesian “proof.” 
 For Huet, since our idea of God was finite, it was necessarily and categorically 
different from God. Being imperfect, our idea could not reflect accurately the nature of a 
supremely perfect being. Consequently, this idea was neither a clear nor a distinct idea of 
God.17 In addition, Huet demonstrated that Descartes’s errors were not only 
philosophical, but theological in nature. He presented Scriptural passages describing the 
inability of human understanding to conceive properly of God, further deconstructing 
Descartes’s notion of a clear and distinct idea of God. Huet concluded that if no such 
clear idea of God existed, then its source could not be attributed necessarily to any 
supremely perfect being. 
 Having thus disposed of the first Cartesian proof, Huet assailed the proof from 
necessary existence. Huet conceded that, in theory, a perfect being could not lack the 
property of existence. However, to combat the Cartesian argument Huet advanced a 
metaphysical claim that divided all things into two categories: 
There are then two sorts of beings: beings that depend entirely on the mind, do not exist 
outside the mind, and are purely fictitious; and beings that actually exist, subsisting 
                                                 
16 Ibid. « l’idée que nous d’un estre infini & souverainement parfait, est quelque chose de finie & 
imparfaite… Des Cartes pretend qu’elle est si excellente, & d’une dignité si relevée que non seulement elle 
surpasse de beaucoup la perfection de noste ame, mais qu’il n’y a que Dieu seul qui la puisse produire »  
17 Ibid., fol. 31. 
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independently of thought in the nature of things. The former are in the terms of the 
schools said to be solely mental, while the latter – real.18
 
Thus, Descartes’s infinite and supremely perfect being could be guaranteed only mental 
existence.19 The presence of a supremely perfect being in the mind could not, in itself, 
necessitate the existence of such a being in the real world. It could only testify to the 
necessary existence of such an idea in the mind:  
From this it is obvious that this objective reality, which according to Descartes exists in 
the idea of an infinite and supremely perfect thing, is entirely inside our mind, and in no 
way depends on the thing which it represents.20
 
Having relegated the Cartesian proofs to an idealist level of certainty, Huet 
achieved his aim and showed that the Cartesian God did not exist necessarily in the realm 
of objective reality. Huet’s refutation not only explicitly rejected the Cartesian proofs of 
God, but implicitly challenged the theological value of such demonstrations. While Huet 
displayed the inadequacy of applying a priori reason to supernatural knowledge in the 
Censura he openly articulated this view in the Traité, arguing that natural human reason 
was a weak and inappropriate source of knowledge. Huet cited St. Thomas Aquinas: 
Things which may be proved demonstratively, as the being of God, the Unity of the 
Godhead, and other Points, are placed among Articles we are to believe, because previous 
to other things that are of Faith: and these must be presupposed at least by such as to have 
no Demonstration of them.21   
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., fol. 32 verso. « Il y a donc de deux sortes d’estres ; des estres qui dependent entierement de l’esprit, 
ne soubsistent point sans l’esprit, & qui sont purement imaginaires, & des estres qui sont effectivement, & 
qui quoyque personne n’y pense ne laissent par de subsister dans la nature des choses. On dit des premiers 
dans l’escole qu’ils ne sont que du costé de l’entendement, & des derniers, qu’ils sont du costé de la 
chose ». (Lennon’s translation from the Latin reads “barbarous language of the schools” p.166). 
19 Ibid. ,fol. 33. Summarized from « De cette manière l’existence de cet estre infini & souverainement 
parfait suit la nature de cet estre, si elle est seulement du costé de l’entendement, il n’aura point d’autre 
existence que celle la si elle est du costé de la chose, son existence sera du mesme costé .» 
20 Ibid., fol. 32. « Dela il est aisé de comprendre que cette Realité objective, qui doit estre selon Des Cartes 
dans l’idée d’une chose infinie & souverainement parfaite, est toute dans nostre ame, & quelle ne depend 
en aucune façon du moins prochainement, de la chose qu’elle nous represente. » 
21 Pierre-Daniel Huet, An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding, trans. Edw. Combe, 
(London: printed for Matthew de Varenne, 1725), 144. 
 79
The implication of Huet’s citation opposed the view of the Lateran Council regarding the 
necessity of accepting the demonstrability of the existence of God and of other former 
preambles to the articles of the faith. In Huet’s view, rational arguments on behalf of the 
existence of God inadvertently undermined faith in God. He perceived Descartes’s 
arguments as both insincere and weak. Since the proofs were so easy to overturn, they 
inadequately defended the most crucial position in Christianity. The longer such debates 
were to continue, the more speculative the defenses of the existence of God would 
become.  
Thus, Huet approached the refutation of Descartes’s proofs from several 
perspectives. First, he was advancing answers against specific dogmatic claims about the 
real nature of things. Second, Huet was implicitly advancing a skeptical view by 
demonstrating the weakness of human reason. Third, he was identifying with the fideist 
position, which claimed that the existence of God could not be demonstrated by natural 
human reason. Such knowledge was accessible only through Christian faith.  
 The fideist position became increasingly appealing as a withdrawal from the 
intense theological quarrel between the Cartesians and the Aristotelians.22 The fideists 
did not wish to enter the debate on the terms of the Lateran Council. Instead of accepting 
the claim that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul were demonstrable by 
reason, they argued, like the Paduan Averroists, that both of these claims were not 
knowable by natural human reason, but could be ensured solely through submission to 
faith in the supernatural revelations. Tertullian (c. 155-230) has generally been identified 
as the first proto-fideist, for his having described Christ’s death in the following way: 
                                                 
22 Kors, 370. 
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“The Son of God died: it is immediately credible--because it is foolish. / He was buried, 
and rose again: it is certain--because it is impossible”23
The scholarly use of the word “fideism” points to another interesting aspect of 
Huet’s thought. The term itself was coined in the nineteenth century to identify a 
movement known within Catholicism as traditionalism, which stood in opposition to 
rationalism. The traditionalists believed that all divine revelation was communicated 
solely through tradition. Thus, they thought that if traditional interpretations of Scripture 
were abandoned, human access to the truths of the Christian Revelation would be lost.24   
Huet’s deep interest in ancient texts, his obsession with philology, and his 
antiquarianism come to mind. If we consider his career, it would be difficult to conclude 
that he believed that all scholarly pursuits should be abandoned. At the same time, he 
denounced man’s reason for its weakness. He advocated the suspension of judgment in 
contentious questions while devoting his whole life to scholarship. The paradox can be 
resolved best with two possibilities. Either Huet believed his scholarly pursuits to be 
meaningless, but, nevertheless, continued them, or he thought that his erudite interests in 
antiquity were the only ones relevant to the attainment of wisdom in man’s fallen state.  
The latter explanation sheds light on Huet’s motivations for writing the 
Demonstratio Evangelica. He thought that the truth of Christianity could only be made 
convincing with reference to antiquity, a method that would reinforce faith in the 
                                                 
23 Tertullian, De Carne Christi, Ch. 5.4, 
http://www.tertullian.org/articles/evans_carn/evans_carn_03latin.htm (4 Jan. 2007) 
“Et mortuus est dei filius; credibile prorsus est, quia ineptum est. 
Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile” 
24 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Fideism,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/#2 (3 Jan. 
2007). 
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Christian revelation. Huet also likely believed that the submission to faith in the Christian 
tradition in all matters theological could consolidate the contentious Catholic community.  
 French fideists were most concerned with proving two specific claims: that 
human beings were incapable of knowing anything about the real world with certainty 
through natural human reason; and that human beings should, consequently, accept faith 
in revelation as the sole source of reliable knowledge. The second point, being more 
significant for the fideists, was necessarily contingent on the first. Consequently, many 
fideists attempted to demonstrate the uncertainty of natural human knowledge about the 
real world. The fideists argued against the usefulness of natural philosophy, contrary to 
the growing confidence in the abilities of the human mind visible in the Cartesian and the 
Baconian revolutions in France and Great Britain, respectively.  
The early and prominent French fideistic skeptic François de La Mothe Le Vayer 
inherited the “mantle” of skepticism from Montaigne, according to Richard Popkin. 
Popkin describes La Mothe Le Vayer’s skeptical corpus as “predominantly illustrative,” 
in the sense that his work provided examples of the usefulness and virtues of skepticism, 
rather than formulating positive theoretical claims about its advantages.25  
 In the Opuscule ou Petit Traité Sceptique sur cette Façon de Parler, N’avoir pas 
le Sens Commun (Opuscule or The Little Skeptical Treatise on the Way of Speaking 
Without Common Sense – 1646), La Mothe Le Vayer questioned the human ability to 
know with certainty any natural truths about the real world, given the fallibility of the 
senses, the human inability to recognize the truth, and the absence of any criteria of 
                                                 
25 Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 83. 
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truth.26 Consequently, man could not obtain an objective knowledge of the real world, 
but could only know the world subjectively and imperfectly. In the Sololiques Sceptiques 
(Skeptical Soliloquies – 1670), La Mothe Le Vayer denied that man was a rational 
animal, claiming instead that man was an “animal desiring knowledge” but never able to 
attain it.27  
Thus, as he claimed in the Discours pour montrer que les Doutes de la 
Philosophie Sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences (A Discourse 
Demonstrating that the Doubts of Skeptical Philosophy Are of Great Use to the Sciences 
– 1668), Pyrrhonism would convince mankind of the uselessness of inquiry and debates 
in natural philosophy.28 It would also demonstrate the lack of absolute truth within the 
framework of human knowledge: 
In fact, the general system [of human knowledge] is composed of logic, physics, and 
morals, from which all human knowledge borrows that which it considers most 
important; [this system] is nothing but a collection of opinions contested by those who 
have time to examine them in depth.29
 
Moving against the intellectual current of the seventeenth century, La Mothe Le Vayer 
opposed the increased attention given to natural philosophy following the Baconian and 
the Cartesian revolutions.  
Pierre Bayle, the most widely read controversialist of the late seventeenth century, 
was the most influential fideist of his time in both Catholic and Protestant Europe. Like 
                                                 
26 François de La Mothe Le Vayer, Œuvres de François de La Mothe Le Vayer, tome 2, (Paris: Chez 
Augustin Courbé, 1654) [The treatise appears on 365-397], 366-7. 
27 La Mothe Le Vayer, Sololiques Sceptiques, (Paris: Louïs Billaine, 1670), 18; « un animal desireux de 
sçavoir » 
28 La Mothe Le Vayer, Œuvres de François de La Mothe Le Vayer, tome 10, partie 2, (Dresden: Chez 
Michel Groell, 1756), 74-75. 
29 François de La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer que les Doutes de la Philosophie Sceptique sont 
de grand usage dans les sciences published in the Ouvrages, 1756, 76; « En effet le systeme general 
compose de la Logique, de la Physique, & de la Morale d’où toutes les connoissances humaines empruntent 
ce qu’elles ont de plus considerable, n’est rien qu’un ramas d’opinions contestées par ceux, qui ont le tems 
de les approfondir. » 
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La Mothe Le Vayer, he propagated doubts about the abilities of natural human reason. At 
the same time, Bayle employed a unique rhetorical method. Instead of openly asserting 
the weakness of human reason, his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (Historical and 
Critical Dictionary – 1697) presented paradoxes and contradictions that plagued the most 
basic human assumptions about the surrounding world. 
In some cases, Bayle questioned contemporaneous advances in natural 
philosophy. In the article on “Zeno of Elea,” Bayle offered an overview of the debate 
regarding the existence of the vacuum. Having challenged the most commonly accepted 
notions of substance, extension, and motion, Bayle wrote: “Our Zeno would be much 
more formidable today than he was in his own time. It can no longer be doubted, he 
would say, that if there were a total plenum, motion would be impossible.”30 Bayle was 
not concerned with resolving the dispute regarding the existence of the vacuum. Rather, 
he sought to demonstrate the multiplicity of controversies and inconsistencies that 
surrounded the most widely accepted views of physics itself. 
 In the second place, the fideists applied the conclusions drawn from their first 
principle to make an epistemological assumption that, given man’s feeble reason and 
senses, mankind should accept faith in revelation as the only source of true and certain 
knowledge. Thus, in addition to saving man from an inexorable search for truth, 
skepticism was, for La Mothe Le Vayer, useful for religion: 
Those who have possess humility and ignorance, at all times, are much better 
accommodated [to receive the supernatural lights of faith] than those who are in spiritual 
darkness. The dogmatists, on the contrary, have never had a stronger concern than to 
make others appear to not know something, became uncontrollably lost [in spiritual 
things], and their presumption to have enough light of the understanding to overcome 
every manner of obscurity causes them to blind themselves in proposing that they believe 
                                                 
30 Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, trans., Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1991), 382. 
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that they are advancing into the darkness that human nature cannot penetrate. I find that 
Skepticism is of no little use to a Christian soul, because it makes the soul surrender all 
those magisterial opinions that are so strongly detested by St. Paul.31
 
La Mothe Le Vayer judged that through total skepticism mankind could attain perfect 
reconciliation with Christianity. He compared the soul of a Christian skeptic to “a field 
cleared and cleansed of bad plants, such as the dangerous axioms of an infinity of learned 
persons, which then receives the dew drops of divine grace much more happily.”32 A 
skeptic’s mind, according to Le Vayer, would not hold any opinions contrary to the true 
faith, because the mind will have accepted its inability to know anything with certainty 
by natural human reason. Having accepted the weakness and irrelevance of reason, the 
soul will turn to faith in revelation for certainty. 
 The mathematician and Jansenist apologist, Blaise Pascal, who was one of the 
most prominent fideists of his time, expressed attitudes similar to that of La Mothe Le 
Vayer’s in his collection of Pensées (1670), arranged by his Jansenist friends for 
posthumous publication. A mathematical prodigy, Pascal became disillusioned with 
mathematics and natural philosophy and turned to the order of Jansenists. Named after 
Flemish theologian Cornelius Otto Jansen (1585-1638), the Jansenists were a 
controversial Catholic movement. Far more than the Thomists, they emphasized the dire 
consequences of man’s fall from grace and believed that no human action on earth, 
independently of the grace of God, could adequately rectify man’s fallen state. 
                                                 
31 François de La Mothe Le Vayer, De la vertu des payens, (Paris: Chez Augustin Coubré, 1647), 224-5; 
« Mais comme ceux qui ont fait de tout temps possession d’humilité & d’ignorance, s’accommodent bien 
mieus que les autres aves ces tenebres spirituelles. Les Dogmatistes au contraire, qui n’ont jamais eu de 
plus forte apprehension que celle de faire paroistre qu’ils ignorant quelque chose, s’y perdent incontinent, 
& leur presumption d’avoir assez de lumiere d’entendement pout surmonter toute sorte d’obsurité, fait 
qu’ils s’aveuglent d’autant plus qu’ils croyent s’avancer dans des tenebres que nostre humanité ne sçauroit 
penetrer. Quoy qu’il en soit je trouve qye la Sceptique n’est pas d’un petit usage à une ame Chrestienne, 
quand elle luy fait perdre toutes ces opinions magistrales que sainct Paul deteste si fort. » 
32 Popkin, 85 cites and translates this passage from La Mothe Le Vayer, Prose Chagrin, in Œuvres, v.9 
(Paris, 1669), 361-2. 
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 Unlike Huet, who demonstrated the futility and the weakness of rational proofs of 
the existence of God through his refutations of the Cartesian proofs of God, Pascal 
explicitly denounced all such “metaphysical” attempts because they were, in his words: 
So remote from human reasoning and so involved that they make little impact, and, even 
if they did help some people, it would be only for the moment during which they watched 
the demonstration, because an hour later they would be afraid they had made a mistake.33
 
Instead of a metaphysical proof of the existence of a supreme being, Pascal proposed a 
wager. In attempting to answer whether or not God exists, man can make two choices. If 
he chooses to believe that God does not exist, two outcomes are possible. If he is correct, 
he wins nothing, since no afterlife exists; but if he is wrong he loses everything, and is 
doomed to hell for eternity. If, on the other hand, man believes that God exists the two 
possible outcomes become significantly more favorable: if he is right, he wins 
everything, but if he is wrong, he loses nothing.34 Pascal’s wager is not a proof, but rather 
an incitement to believe. Pascal maintained that such an argument would be more 
convincing, more effective, and more appealing than obscure metaphysical 
demonstrations, because faith was “God perceived by the heart, not by the reason.”35
Pascal also claimed that “faith is different from proof. [The latter] is human and 
the [former] a gift of God.”36 He warned about submitting religious doctrines to the 
scrutiny of natural reason, claiming that the Christian “religion will be left with nothing 
mysterious or supernatural.”37 Without such elements, Christianity would, in Pascal’s 
view, lose its most essential feature. 
                                                 
33 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans., A.J. Krailsheimer, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 57. 
34 Ibid., 123. 
35 Ibid., 127. 
36 Ibid., 4. 
37 Ibid., 54. 
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Bayle was similarly concerned with an overly rationalist approach to theology. In 
his article on “King David,” Bayle painted a disturbing picture of a revered biblical 
figure, described in Scripture as a murderer and an adulterer. At the same time, Bayle 
noted, Scripture claimed that David was beloved by God, which meant that all his earthly 
sins did not prevent David from being accepted into heaven.38 Bayle used this 
paradoxical situation to reinforce the incomprehensibility to human intelligence of God’s 
judgments and ways.  
Although Bayle began his article on “Pyrrho” by claiming that Pyrrhonism was 
dangerous to theology and religion, he concluded on a very different note: 
Our reason is a path that leads us astray since, when it displays itself with the greatest 
subtlety, it plunges us into such an abyss. The natural conclusion of this ought to be to 
renounce this guide and to implore the cause of all things to give us a better one. This is a 
great step toward the Christian religion; for it requires that we look to God for knowledge 
of what we ought to believe and what we ought to do, and that we enslave our 
understanding to the obeisance of faith. If a man is convinced that nothing good is to be 
expected from his philosophical inquiries, he will be more disposed to pray to God to 
persuade him of the truths that ought to be believed than if he flatters himself that he 
might succeed by reasoning and disputing.39
 
Bayle expressed the most fundamental fideistic argument and, at the same time, exposed 
his intentions. Like Pascal and Le Mothe Le Vayer, Bayle believed that the most basic 
tenets of Christianity had to be approached through faith and not through reasoning and 
argument. In Bayle’s view, skepticism was useful for being able to demonstrate the 
weakness of natural reason and, consequently, for leading man to find refuge in 
supernatural belief. Thus, his aim in the Dictionary was to convince his readers of the 
theological uselessness of philosophy and to guide them towards accepting faith.  
Like La Mothe Le Vayer and Bayle, Pascal also desired to see reason cede to the 
rule of faith. At the same time, he cited St. Augustine, claiming that “reason would never 
                                                 
38 Bayle, 62-3 
39 Ibid., 206. 
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submit unless she perceived appropriate occasions to do so.”40 Huet’s marginal note on 
this passage in his copy of the Pensées is particularly revealing: 
He supposes that this submission should depend on reason: but it seems to me on the 
contrary, that to submit reason to faith is more of a feat of faith than of reason. Reason 
and faith are equally imperious, and neither would ever agree to submit to the other, 
unless it is done involuntarily, by violence and opposition. Therefore, one of the two 
must defeat the other, and it is up to faith to make reason submit, not otherwise.41  
 
Huet’s analysis of Pascal reveals his own perception of reason. He envisioned that the 
struggle between reason and faith went much further than that described by Pascal. For 
Huet, reason had to be coaxed into submission, because it would never voluntarily accept 
inferiority with respect to faith.  
While it should not seem that La Mothe Le Vayer, Pascal, and Bayle are identical 
thinkers, their fideism was based on similar principles. All three believed that natural 
human reason was feeble and, therefore, incapable of discovering knowledge about the 
surrounding natural world (and particularly about God). All three considered rational 
proofs of the existence of God irrelevant to Christianity. Instead, they called upon 
submission of reason to faith.  
 Huet also argued that the suspension of judgment in all philosophical questions 
prepared “the Mind for the reception of divine Faith.”42 He thought that if skepticism 
were to be adopted as a philosophical attitude, it would prevent acerbic debates in natural 
philosophy and, more importantly for Huet, in theology: 
                                                 
40 Pascal, Pensées, (Paris: Chez G. Desprez, 1670), 48, as published in Raymond Francis, Les pensées de 
Pascal en France de 1842 à 1942, (Paris: Librarie Nizet, 1959), 382. « La raison, dit St. Augustin, ne se 
soumettrait jamais si elle ne jugeait qu’il y a des occasions où elle doit se soumettre. » 
41 Huet’s margin note on Pascal, Pensées, (Paris: 1670), 48, as published in Raymond Francis, Les pensées 
de Pascal en France de 1842 à 1942, (Paris: Librarie Nizet, 1959), 382. « Il suppose que cette soumission 
même doit dépendre de la raison: et il me semble au contraire que, de soumettre la raison à la foi, est plutôt 
l’ouvrage de la foi que de la raison; parce que la raison et la foi sont également impérieuses, et que, l’une 
ne consentira jamais d’être soumise à l’autre, et si elle l’est ce sera involontairement, par violence, et par 
contraire. Or l’un des deux devant vaincre l’autre, il appartient à la foi de soumettre la raison, et non pas à 
la raison de soumettre la foi. » 
42 Huet, Traité, 163. 
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Faith is a Gift that God is pleased to grant to them who trust not too much to the Strength 
of Nature, presume not too far on the Penetration of their Reason, nor espouse their own 
Sentiments with affected Obstinacy, but diligently prepare their minds to receive it.43
 
Indeed, Huet’s concern with the relationship between faith and reason has received little 
attention. His Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, however, reveals 
Huet’s deep concern with the issue and definitively reconciles his skepticism and his 
Catholic faith:44  
I undertook the discussion of the very difficult topic concerning the agreement of Reason 
and Faith; or, what ought to be the province of reason in adopting faith; and how far the 
empire of faith over reason ought to extend.45
 
Reason, Huet wrote, was merely a faculty that assisted us in learning things, either by 
perception or by reflection.46 Faith, on the other hand, was a gift granted by God to 
mankind. Faith alone could guarantee absolute truth.47  
Huet described a conflict between the two sources of knowledge. As in his note 
on Pascal’s Pensées, Huet declared that reason, “when she is turbulent and commanding, 
refuses to cede to other arbiters.”48 The human mind thus becomes divided and turns to 
“sedition and tumultuousness” never resting in peace.49 Such peace, according to Huet, 
could only be established under the guidance of faith, claiming that “she [reason] must 
know herself, become aware of her weakness, and not aspire to give us happiness and 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 165. 
44 Alnetanae is the place adjective for Alnetum, the Latin name for the Abbey Aunay in Normandy. Huet 
received Aunay from the king in 1674 and retired there in 1680. In 1685 Huet moved to Soissons and then 
later to Avranches. The title of the work suggests that Huet attributed some connection between his work 
and the time he spent in Aunay. This would suggest that the work was conceived in the first half of the 
1680’s. It is surprising that this work has neither been translated from Latin nor transferred off Microfilm. 
45 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Memoirs of the life of Peter Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches, written by himself, 
v.2, trans. John Aiken, (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, ... and Cadell and Davies..., 
1810), 202. 
46 Huet, Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, (Paris: Apud Thomas Moette, 1690), 
microform, 7.  
47 Ibid., 16. 
48 Ibid, 4-5. “(Rations nostrae dissidum); quae cum turbulenta sit & imperiosa, alienis parere recusant 
arbitris…” 
49 Ibid., 5. “dat se in seditionem & tumultim” 
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eternal health, when we cannot even know truth through her.”50 Huet believed that 
natural human reason inhibited the reception of divine truth. This human faculty was 
overly ambitious, discounting its own limitations and consistently attempting to exert its 
rule over man, in natural and supernatural questions.  
Consequently, Huet proposed that faith and reason should operate within different 
domains. The former, he argued, should be concerned with all matters of religious belief. 
Reason could operate autonomously, but should never be applied to matters of faith.51 
Conversely, faith would not interfere in questions of natural philosophy.52 In such a state, 
no conflict would exist between the two faculties, because each would be concerned with 
a particular realm of knowledge. Huet’s system did not call for a complete elimination of 
reliance on natural reason, but rather sought to establish a structural relationship, under 
which reason would be in a position of obedience and subordination to things known by 
faith.  
Thus, Huet could defend supernatural truths without reference to abstract proofs: 
“I believe that God is three in one, not because of reason, but because of the first revealed 
truth.”53 The supernatural world could coexist with the natural world. The division was 
crucial, in Huet’s mind, to preventing scholars from attempting to discuss matters of faith 
from a philosophical perspective. Cartesians and Aristotelians would no longer attempt to 
prove truths that could be certain only through belief in revelation.  
                                                 
50 Ibid.; “Agnoscat ipsa sese, suæque sibi imbecillitatis conscia felicitatem ac æternam 
salutem nobis conciliare se non posse speret, per quam ne veritatis quidem compotes esse possumus.” 
51 Ibid., 61. 
52 Ibid., 74-75. 
53 Ibid., 30. “Credo Deum esse trinum & unum, non propter Ratione, sed propter primam veritatem 
revelantem quæ id revelatit.” 
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 The Quaestiones appeared, logically and temporally, between the Censura and the 
Traité. While the Censura explicitly challenged only one particular philosophy, it 
implicitly attacked the presumption of reason. The Quaestiones relegated reason to a 
separate and unequal position with respect to faith. The Traité struck the final blow to 
reason, demonstrating its utter feebleness.  
 Some modern historians have perceived the continuity in Huet’s works but have 
not adequately analyzed the relationship between faith and reason in Huet’s philosophy. 
Christian Bartholmèss claims that the Traité presented the extreme conclusions that 
followed from the principles advanced in Huet’s two preceding works (the Censura and 
the Quaestiones).54 According to April Shelford, Huet declared his intention to make the 
Traité the fourth book of the Quaestiones to Etienne Pirot (1631-1713), a Sorbonne 
theologian and censor.55 Historian Germain Malbreil argues that the Traité was supposed 
to serve as the first book of the Quaestiones, because it would have logically paved the 
way for the demonstration of the superiority of faith.56 While the sequential order is of 
secondary importance to our argument, the continuity of themes reveals Huet’s view of 
his own project. He perceived a unity between the Quaestiones and the Censura: 
Each of these treatises, that in which I endeavored to conciliate reason and faith, and that 
in which I oppugned the Cartesian philosophy, were part of a greater work which I had 
planned in my mind and of which it will not be foreign to the purpose of this book to give 
a sketch.57
 
Thus, as was argued in the second chapter, Huet’s opposition to Descartes was motivated 
largely by his opposition to Cartesian intellectual optimism in philosophy. Huet’s 
                                                 
54 Christian Bartholmèss, Huet évèque d’Avranches ou le scepticisme théologique, (Paris: Franck, 1850), 
50. 
55 April Shelford, Faith and glory: Pierre-Daniel Huet and the making of the Demonstratio Evangelica 
(1679). Ph.D. Dissertation, (Princeton University, 1997), 453. 
56 Germain Malbreil, “Les droits de la raison et de la foi, la dissociation de la raison, la metamorphose de la 
foi, selon Pierre-Daniel Huet,” Dix-Septième Siècle 37 no. 2 (1985), 131. 
57 Huet, Memoirs, v.2, 203. 
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“greater work” could be interpreted as a skeptical fideistic project that culminated in the 
Traité. Huet admitted that his “love and esteem” of ancient philosophy led him to study 
ancient sects in depth. His studies, however, led him to express astonishment about and 
disillusionment with philosophy: 
And as this science [philosophy] is boundless, wandering into immensity beyond the 
limits of time and creation, whilst the human mind, cooped within narrow bounds, 
depressed to earth, and involved in thick darkness, attempts by the aid of its reason to 
break forth into the light, and to seize upon the arduous summits of truth, I proposed to 
enquire how high it could raise itself by its own powers and what aids were to be sought 
for it from faith. These exalted studies long, much, and not unpleasantly, exercised my 
mind and the accumulated product of my labors was swelling to a great bulk, when I 
thought it would be more useful, and better accommodated to common understandings, if 
it were divided into parts, and brought under certain head.58
 
By “parts,” Huet was referring to the Censura, the Quaestiones, and the Traité, all of 
which combined skeptical arguments with a fideistic outlook in opposition to the 
increasingly rational and naturalistic current of seventeenth-century theology.  
 Although Huet perceived Descartes and the Cartesians as his main opponents and 
wanted to remove natural reason from intervention in matters of religion, his project was 
not widely appreciated, as reactions to the Traité in Huet’s correspondence reveal.  
While Huet’s friends perceived the sincerity of his arguments, they disparaged 
Huet’s fideism. Huet sent a manuscript of the Traité to his friend Charles de La Rue 
(1643-1725), a preacher and orator at the Society of Jesus. He received a less than 
favorable reply. De La Rue urged Huet to suppress the more shocking and controversial 
parts of the treatise, warning of the potential “public fury” against Huet.59 De La Rue also 
predicted the reaction of Huet’s friends: 
You will see the greater part of your friends either declaring against you or, at least, not 
daring to defend you…You will say that I am afraid, and that one ought not fear for the 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 204-205. 
59 Shelford, Faith and Glory, 452. 
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truth! I will confess to you, I am afraid. But I will respond that this truth is not so 
important that you, in its defense, must take on the whole world.60
 
Such a reaction illuminates Huet’s reasons for not publishing the Traité and accurately 
predicts the future outrage. Huet’s social standing and his friendships required a certain 
amount of discretion with respect to religious controversies.  
Pirot, the Sorbonne censor, was appalled by the work and troubled by the 
consequences of Huet’s skepticism. He wrote that by claiming the impossibility of 
attaining true and certain knowledge through natural reason, Huet “deprived Christian 
apologists of an essential tool,” thereby undermining faith, not buttressing it.61 For Pirot 
and other Jesuits, Huet’s views were in direct opposition to their professional vocations 
and roles. 
Strictly speaking, Huet’s position was heretical because it stood in direct 
opposition to the Fifth Lateran Council by claiming that reason could not demonstrate the 
existence of God. Pirot and De La Rue did not doubt the sincerity of Huet’s religious 
beliefs. On the other hand, they could not allow him to advertise his views openly, for 
fear of a backlash. Thus, Huet’s intentions were understood but not widely supported. 
When the Traité was finally published in 1723, it received much criticism from 
Huet’s other friends and colleagues. Many claimed that Huet could not have written the 
work, until Huet’s friend abbé Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’Olivet (1682-1768) produced the 
original manuscript in Huet’s hand.62 Others were dismayed over the book’s content and 
                                                 
60 Ibid., Shelford cites and translates parts of the letter. (De La Rue to Huet, n.d., BN Ms. Fr., 15188, fol. 
328-331). 
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verso; Huet to Pirot, n.d., BL Ashburnham 1866, #1970; Pirot to Huet, 8 May 1692, BL Ashburnham 1866, 
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62 Léon Tolmer, Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) humaniste, physicien, (Bayeux : Colas, 1949), 550-1. 
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distraught by its author’s conclusions.63 It is difficult to know whether the expressed 
reactions were sincere or feigned, given that Huet had circulated a manuscript of the 
work among his friends.  
D’Olivet defended Huet’s memory against the onslaught of criticism. He 
explained the main arguments of the Traité and claimed that these arguments could have 
been easily perceived in Huet’s earlier works.64 He similarly suggested that there was 
nothing irreligious in the Traité, as the opinions proposed therein did not contradict the 
teachings of the Church.65 He regretted that Catholic intellectuals had “treated such a 
man as Huet like the world would treat a Bodin or a Spinoza” for having properly 
identified faith as the God-given, and consequently infallible source of knowledge.66  
            * * * 
Huet’s pious intentions were shared by those who chastised his skeptical treatise. 
His tactics, however, appeared excessively unconventional. Despite such a perception, 
Huet’s fideistic skepticism presented one of the most orthodox reactions to the 
naturalization of theology in the seventeenth century. Huet sought to convince his 
contemporaries to abandon rational arguments concerning the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul and to accept these beliefs on faith alone. Reliance on faith was 
the only thing that could, in Huet’s view, prevent the complete overthrow of orthodox 
intellectual authorities.  
                                                 
63 Kors, 370; and Thomas Lennon, “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de 
l’esprit Humain,” in Scepticisme et modernité, ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien Charles, (Saint-
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Chez J.B. Coignard, 1743), 388-389. 
65 Ibid., 389. 
66 Ibid., 390; “…qu l’on ait traité un home tel que M. Huet, comme on traiteroit un Bodin & un Spinoza” 
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Although Huet denounced human reason, his humanist pursuits indicate that he 
thought that some remnants of truth could be found in antiquity. For the modern reader, 
he occupied the wrong place in the battle of ancients and moderns. Arguing that ancient 
sources possessed significantly more value than modern ones ever could, Huet stood 
against the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century and doomed himself to 
relative oblivion for the future. Huet is thus a tragic figure: he understood the dangers 
presented by rationalism to traditional authorities, but he was disparaged for his efforts by 
those who claimed to represent those very authorities. He was forgotten by modernity for 
his orthodoxy, and censured by his friends for what they perceived as his heterodoxy. His 
case sheds light on the tensions and the dilemmas of Catholicism in seventeenth-century 
culture.  
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Conclusion 
 
The study of Huet’s thought is important to understanding the seventeenth century 
and its intellectual climate. It demonstrates that seemingly contradictory intellectual 
positions can be reconciled when they are considered historically. An historical analysis 
that blends context with particular ideas expressed in that context reveals new details 
regarding both each of these elements and their interrelationship. An investigation of 
Huet’s publications in view of the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France sheds 
light on the tensions between developments in natural philosophy and established 
theological claims. Such a study provides a prism through which we are able to analyze 
both disciplines more closely, revealing the nuanced relationship between the two in the 
eyes of learned Europe. 
While the thesis has demonstrated that Huet was not alone in his philosophical 
and theological views, it remains difficult to establish how far the influence of fideistic 
skepticism spread. Such beliefs may have often been concealed from public view, as with 
Huet. Consequently, this thesis has demonstrated the methodological importance of using 
unpublished sources. These have revealed crucial facts about Huet’s intellectual 
development, allowing for the reinterpretation of his philosophy. Thus, it would be 
interesting to substantiate further the pervasiveness of such beliefs by studying the views 
of seventeenth and eighteenth century skeptics more meticulously than has been 
previously done. 
The continuity demonstrated in Huet’s intellectual development and scholarship 
reveals the particular but historically revealing nature of his skeptical thought. Huet’s 
case shows how a scholar of his background could have become disillusioned with the 
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uncertainties that permeated the dogmatic philosophies of his time, and how such an 
intellectual could have ultimately come to espouse skeptical philosophical positions that 
rejected the human mind as a criterion of truth and certainty. This conversion, in its 
deepest aims, maintained the goals of his Jesuit education. Huet, after all, was a Catholic 
apologist who experienced an intellectual disillusionment with the methods of apologetic 
works, but not with their purpose. He saw in fideistic skepticism the best defense of 
revealed truths. Huet’s fideism aimed at moving supernatural questions away from the 
scrutiny of natural philosophy.  
In Descartes, Huet perceived the most dangerous and influential manifestation of 
rationalism applied to supernatural religious truths. All philosophical attempts to prove 
the existence of God were, in Huet’s mind, not only futile, but also enfeebling to the 
faith. Thus, Huet’s philosophical and theological positions aimed to preserve traditional 
authority from reexamination by the new philosophy of the scientific revolution. When 
confidence in the powers of natural reason and in the human ability to know things with 
certainty was on the rise, Huet thought he could oppose this intellectual current with 
skeptical arguments. 
It is ironic that the majority of Huet’s anti-Cartesian works were published after 
Cartesianism had essentially won the intellectual struggle in France. His Censura 
represents a desperate attempt to reveal the errors of Cartesianism. The Nouveaux 
mémoires is a sarcastic work that, in its bitterness, acknowledged the loss to 
Cartesianism. Huet’s Traité was thus the last attempt to dethrone Cartesian dogmatism.  
Nonetheless, those who Huet believed should have supported him in the battle to 
preserve the intellectual traditions of Catholic France chastised his skepticism. His Jesuit 
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friends perceived his views to be perilous to their intellectual agenda, maintaining that 
rational arguments were necessary for reinforcing the faith. His decision not to publish 
the Traité signals his profound disappointment with the reactions of his colleagues. After 
all, if his ideas were not supported in the Catholic community, they could not be used for 
its defense. 
Revealingly, Huet’s critics were not able to perceive that he could embody both a 
commitment to philosophical skepticism and an insatiable quest for erudite knowledge. 
This combination certainly makes Huet unique in his own right. Despite having 
proclaimed the futility of attempting to know truths about the real world with certainty, 
he continued to engage in extensive scholarly pursuits. Huet believed that the knowledge 
of the divine, or at least wisdom, could be acquired through meticulous philological 
investigations. At the same time, he conceded that this knowledge could not be certain. 
 Huet’s legacy is difficult to analyze because the Enlightenment appropriated most 
skeptical arguments to serve its own anti-supernatural agenda. After the Enlightenment, it 
became difficult to conceive of a combination of philosophical skepticism and religious 
orthodoxy. This reinterpretation of Huet signals the need to reconsider the views of other 
skeptics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries regarding the relationship between 
faith and natural reason. 
 Huet belongs to an understudied world of the opponents of Enlightenment and 
pre-Enlightenment rationalism. Their arguments were eclipsed by the unprecedented 
demonstrations of confidence in the human ability to know things with certainty. Huet’s 
commitment to skepticism reveals his perception of the forthcoming revolutionary 
changes in the conceptual understanding of philosophy, theology, and the appropriate 
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relationship between the two. The analysis of the context, the evolution, and the nature of 
his ideas sheds light on the historical implications of the dramatic transformation of 
European thought in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
 99
Bibliography 
 
Primary sources: 
Works containing Huet’s marginalia  
Bernier, François. Abbregé de la Philosophie de Gassendi. Lyon: Chez Anisson & Posuel, 1678.  
(Bibliothèque Nationale de France Call Number: Rés. R 3554) 
Daniel, P. Gabriel. Traité théologique touchant l’efficacité de la grace. Paris: Chez Nicolas  
Le Clerc, 1705. (BNF Call Number: D 90632) 
Descartes, René. Meditationes de Philosophia. Amsterdam: Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1650.  
(BNF Call Number: Résac. R 3499) 
________. Lettres de Monsieur Descartes ou sont traitées plusieurs belles questions touchant la  
Morale, la Physique, la Médicine, et les Mathématiques. Paris: Charles Angot, 1663- 
1667. (BNF Call Number: Rés. R 3520-2) 
Des Gabets, Robert. Critique de la critique de la recherche de la verité, ou l’on decouvre le  
chemin qui conduit aux connoissances solides. Paris: Chez Jean Du Puis, 1675. (BNF 
Call Number: Résac. R 11358) 
Malebranche, Nicolas. De la recherché de la vérité. Paris: Chez Andre Pralard, 1674. (BNF Call  
Number: Rés. R 1925)  
________. De la recherché de la vérité. Paris: Chez Andre Pralard, 1678. (BNF Call Number:  
Rés. R 1926) 
Montaigne, Michel de. Les Essais de Michel de Montaigne. Paris: Chez L. Rondet, C. Journel, et  
R. Chevillion, 1669. (BNF Call Number: Rés. Z 2771-2773) 
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Paris: G. Desprez, 1670. (BNF Call Number: Rés. D 21375) 
Regis, Pierre Sylvain. Reponse au livre qui a pourtitre P. Danielis Huetii, Episcopi  
Suessionensis designati, Cesnsura Philosophiae Cartesianae. Paris : Jean Cusson, 1691. 
(BNF Call Number: Résac. R 13607) 
Sextus Empiricus. Opera. Geneva: Sumptibus Petri & Jacobi Chouët, 1621. (BNF Call Number:  
Résac. R 69) 
 
Other Primary Sources 
Bacon, Francis. New Organon. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960. 
Bayle, Pierre. Correspondance de Pierre Bayle. ed. Elisabeth Labrousse et al. Oxford: Voltaire  
Foundation, 1999. 
Bayle, Pierre. Historical and Critical Dictionary. trans. Pierre Bayle. London: Printed for C.  
Harper et. al., 1710. 
________. Historical and Critical Dictionary. trans., Richard Popkin. Indianapolis, Cambridge:  
Hackett Publishing Company, 1991. 
________. Pensées diverses: ecrites à un docteur de Sorbonne, a l'occasion de la comete qui  
parut au mois de decembre 1680. Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1704. 
Bibliothèque Ancienne et Moderne. ed. Jean Leclerc. 1714-1740. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints,  
1968. 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MSS.: Fonds Français, 14702 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MSS.: Fonds Français, 14703 
Bibliothèque Universelle et Historique. ed. Jean Leclerc. 1686-1693. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints,  
1968. 
Charron, Pierre. Les Trois véritez. Paris: R Bertault, 1625. 
 100
Correspondance de Bossuet. ed. Urbain et Levesque. Vaduz: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1965 
Descartes, René. Discourse on the Method. In Discourse on Method and Related Writings. trans.  
Desmond Clarke. New York and London: Penguin Books, 1999. 
________. Meditations on First Philosophy. trans. Donald Cress. Indianapolis, Cambridge:  
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. 
Foucher, Simon. La critique de la Recherche de la vérité où on examine en même temps une  
partie des principes de M. Descartes. Paris : M. Coustelier, 1675.  
Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans. Ed. Henri Basnage de Beauval. 1687-1709. Geneva: Slatkine  
Reprints, 1969. 
Huet, Pierre-Daniel. Against Cartesian philosophy [Censura philosophiae Cartesianae]. ed.,  
trans. Thomas M. Lennon. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003. 
________. Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei. Cadomi, apud Joannem  
Cavelier, 1690. Microform. 
________. Censura philosophiae Cartesianae. Paris: Apud Danielem Horthemels, 1689.  
________. Demonstratio Evangelica. Amsterdam: Janssonio-Waesbergios, 1680. 
________. Dissertations sur diverses matières de religion et de philologie contenues en  
plusieurs lettres écrites par des personnes savants de ce temps. Paris: Chez François  
Fournier, 1712. 
________. An essay concerning the weakness of human understanding. trans. Edw. Combe,  
London: printed for Matthew de Varenne, 1725. [electronic resource: 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?dd=0&locID=pennuniv&d1=071090180
 0&srchtp=a&c=1&SU=0LRF&d2=2&docNum=CW3321336629&h2=1&vrsn=1.0&
 af=BN&d6=2&ste=10&dc=tiPG&stp=Author&d4=0.33&n=10&d5=d6&ae=T109143] 
________. Huetiana, ou pensées diverses de M. Huet. Amsterdam: H. Uytwerf, 1723. 
________. Mémoires (1718). Toulouse: Société de Littératures Classiques, 1993. 
________. Memoirs of the life of Peter Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches, written by himself.  
trans. John Aiken. London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, ... and Cadell 
and Davies..., 1810. 
________. Nouveaux mémoires pour server a l’histoire du Cartesianisme. Paris, 1692. 
________. Nouveaux mémoires pour server a l’histoire du Cartesianisme. ed. Claudine  
 Poulouin. Rézé: Séquences, 1996  
________. A Philosophical Treatise Concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding.  
London : Printed for Gysbert Dommer, 1725. 
________. Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain. Londres: chez Jean Nourse,  
1741 [electronic resource: 
 http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?dd=0&locID=pennuniv&d1=040960210
 0&srchtp=a&SU=0LRF&c=1&d2=1&docNum=CW3319716647&h2=1&vrsn=1.0&
 af=BN&d6=1&ste=10&d4=0.33&stp=Author&dc=tiPG&n=10&d5=d6&ae=T114368] 
________. Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain. (1723 Edition Reprint)  
Hildesheim, New York: Olms, 1974.  
Journal de Trévoux, ou Mémoires pour l'histoire des sciences et des beaux-arts. 1702-1767.  
Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1968. 
Journal des sçavans. ed. Denis de Salle. (1665 – 1717) Amsterdam, 1665-1792.  
La Mothe Le Vayer, François de. De la vertu des payens. Paris: Chez Augustin Courbé, 1647 
________. Œuvres de François de La Mothe Le Vayer. Paris: Chez Augustin Courbé, 1654. 
________. Œuvres de François de La Mothe Le Vayer. Dresden: Chez Michel Groell, 1756. 
 101
________. Sololiques Sceptiques. Paris: Louïs Billaine, 1670. 
Montaigne, Michel de. Essays. In The Complete Works of Montaigne. trans. Donald M. Frame.  
 Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. 
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. ed. Pierre Bayle. 1684-1718. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints,  
1966. 
Olivet, Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’ and Pellisson, Paul. Histoire de l’Académie Françoise. Paris:  
 Chez J.B. Coignard, 1743. 
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. trans., A.J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin Books, 1995. 
________. Pensées de Mr. Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets, qui ont este  
trouvees apres sa mort parmy ses papiers. Amsterdam: chez Abraham Wolfganck, 1677. 
Tertullian, De Carne Christi. [Accessed on 4 January 2007 at:  
http://www.tertullian.org/articles/evans_carn/evans_carn_03latin.htm] 
 
Secondary Sources: 
Bartholmèss, Christian. Huet évèque d’Avranches ou le scepticisme théologique. Paris: Franck,  
1850.  
Borghero, Carlo. “Cartesius scepticus Aspects de la querelle sur le scepticisme de Descartes  
dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle.” In Le scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle: Le  
retour de philosophies antiques à l’Age classique. Tome II. ed. Pierre-François Moreau.  
Paris: Albin Michel, 2001, 391-406.  
Bracken, Harry M.  “Bayle not a Sceptic?” Journal of the History of Ideas 25 no. 2 (1964), 
169-180. 
Brahami, Frédéric. Le scepticisme de Montaigne. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1997. 
Burke, Peter. Montaigne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Brockliss, L.W.B. French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A  
Cultural History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
Cavaillé, Jean Pierre. “Scepticisme, tromperie et mensonge chez La Mothe Le Vayer et  
Descartes.” In The Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. ed. 
Gianni Paganini. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 115-131. 
Dainville, François de. L’éducation des jésuites : XVIe-XVIIIe siècles. Paris, Editions de Minuit,  
1978. 
________. La Naissance de l’humanisme moderne. Paris: Beauchesne, 1940. 
Francis, Raymond. Les pensées de Pascal en France de 1842 à 1942. Paris: Librarie Nizet, 1959. 
Goodrum, Matthew R., “Atheism, and the Spontaneous Generation of Human Beings: The  
Debate over a Natural Origin of the First Humans in Seventeenth-Century Britain.” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 63 no. 2 (2002), 207-224. 
Grendler, Paul Friedrich. The Universities of the Italian Rennaissance. Baltimore: Johns  
Hopikins University Press, 2004. 
Hefele, Charles-Joseph ed., Histoire des Conciles d'après les documents originaux. trans. J. 
 Cardinal Gergenroether. Paris: Librarie Letouzet et Ané, 1917. 
Jean, Bernard and Mouret, François. Montaigne, Descartes et Pascal par la dissertation. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971. 
Kors, Alan Charles. Atheism in France, 1650-1729. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press,  
1990. 
Labrousse, Elisabeth. “Reading Pierre Bayle in Paris.” In Anticipations of the Enlightenment in  
 102
England, France, and Germany. ed. Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987, 7-16. 
Lennon, Thomas M. “Foucher, Huet, and the Downfall of Cartesianism,” In Cartesian Views:  
Papers presented to Richard A. Watson. ed. Thomas Lennon. Boston: Brill, 2003,  
117-128. 
________. “Huet, Descartes and the Objection of Objections.” In Skepticism in Renaissance and  
Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations. eds. Neto and Popkin. Amherst, NY: 
Humanity Books, 2004, 123-142. 
________. “Huet, Malebranche and the Birth of Skepticism.” In The Return of Skepticism: From  
Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. ed. Gianni Paganini. London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000, 149-165. 
________. “Huet on the reality of Cartesian doubt.” In Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism  
and anti-Cartesianism in early modern Europe. ed. Tad Schmaltz. London, New York: 
Routeledge, 2005, 63-79. 
________. “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain.”  
In Scepticisme et modernité. ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien Charles. Saint-
Etienne: Université de Saint-Etienne, 2005, 65-75. 
Malbreil, Germain. “Les droits de la raison et de la foi, la dissociation de la raison, la  
metamorphose de la foi, selon Pierre-Daniel Huet.” Dix-Septième Siècle 37 no. 2, (1985), 
119-133. 
Massimi, Jean-Robert. “Vérité et Histoire Chez P.D. Huet.” Dix-Septième Siècle 37 no. 2 (1985), 
167-168. 
McKenna, Anthony. “Huet et Pascal.” Dix-Septième Siècle 37 no. 2, (1985), 135-142. 
________. “Skepticism at Port-Royal: The Perversion of Pyrrhonian Doubt.” In The  
Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. ed. Gianni Paganini. 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 249-265. 
Montaigne: scepticisme, métaphysique, théologie. eds. Vincent Carraud, Jean-Luc Marion,  
Jocelyn Benoist et al. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004. 
Moreau, Pierre-François. “Les arguments sceptiques dans la lecture de l’Ecriture sainte.” In Le  
scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle: Le retour de philosophies antiques à l’Age  
classique. Tome II. ed. Pierre-François Moreau. Paris: Albin Michel, 2001, 382-390. 
Neto, José Maia. “Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy.” Journal of the History of  
Ideas 58 no. 2 (1997), 199-220.  
________. “Charron’s Epoché and Descarte’s Cogito: The Sceptical Base of Descartes’  
Refutation of Skepticism.” In The Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to  
Bayle. ed. Gianni Paganini. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 81-113. 
________. “Epoche as Perfection: Montaigne’s View of Ancient Skepticism.” In  
Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations. eds.  
Neto and Popkin. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004, 13-42. 
________. “Foucher’s Academic Cartesianism.” In Cartesian Views: Papers presented to  
Richard A. Watson. ed. Thomas M. Lennon. Boston: Brill, 2003, 71-95. 
Paganini, Gianni. “Scepticisme, véracité et omnipotence divine à l’aube des Lumières: le cas de  
Pierre Bayle.” In Scepticisme et modernité. ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien 
Charles. Saint-Etienne: Université de Saint-Etienne, 2005, 25-63. 
Popkin, Richard Henry and Neto, José Maia. “Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Remarks on Pascal.”  
British Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (1995), 147-160. 
 103
Popkin, Richard Henry. “Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Remarks on Malebranche.” In Nicholas  
Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors. ed. Stuart Brown.  
Assen/Mastricht: Van Gorcum, 1991, 10-20. 
________. “Cartesianism and Biblical Criticism.” In Problems in Cartesianism. ed. Lennon et.  
al. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 61-81 
________. “For a Revised History of Skepticism.” In The Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes  
and Descartes to Bayle. ed. Gianni Paganini. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000, xxi-xxviii. 
________. The High Road to Pyrrhonism. San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980.  
________. The History of Scepticism : from Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford, New York : Oxford  
University Press, 2003. 
________. “The Marginalia and Correspondence of Pierre-Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches.”  
American Philosophical Society Yearbook, 1957, 364-366. 
________. “Pierre Bayle and Bishop Huet, the Master Skeptics” In The Columbia History of  
Western Philosophy. ed. Popkin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 404-412. 
________. “The Skeptical Precursors of David Hume.” Philosophy and Phenomenological  
Research 16 no. 1 (1955), 61-71. [Accessed online on 6 July 2006 at: 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-
8205%28195509%2916%3A1%3C61%3ATSPODH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2] 
________. “Sources of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume’s Time” Journal of the History  
of Ideas 54 no.1 (1993), 137-141.  
Rodis-Lewis, Genevièvre. “Huet lecteur de Malebranche.” Dix-Septième Siècle 37 no. 2 (1985),  
169-189. 
Scepticism and irreligion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. eds. Richard Popkin and  
Arjo Vanderjagt. Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill, 1993. 
Scribiano, Emanuela. “Foucher and the Dilemmas of Representation: a ‘Modern’ Problem?” In  
The Return of Skepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. ed. Gianni Paganini.  
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 197-212. 
Schmaltz, Tad M. “French Cartesianism in Context: The Paris Formulary and Regis’s Usage.” In  
Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and anti-Cartesianism in early modern Europe.  
ed. Tad Schmaltz. London, New York: Routeledge, 2005, 80-95. 
Shelford, April. Faith and glory: Pierre-Daniel Huet and the making of the Demonstratio  
Evangelica (1679). Ph.D. Dissertation. Princeton University, 1997. 
________. “Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica  (1679).”  
Journal of the History of Ideas 63 no. 4 (2002), 599-617  
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Fideism.” [Accessed on 3 Janurary 2007 at  
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/#2] 
Sterm Brennan, Katherine. “La zèle religieux et la discipline de la République des Lettres à Caen  
au XVII siecle: les rapports entre Pierre-Daniel Huet et Samuel Bochart.” Annales de 
Normandie  46 no. 5 (1996), 697-708. 
Tolmer Léon. Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) humaniste, physicien. Bayeux: Colas, 1949. 
Urbain, Charles. “La Bibliothèque de P. Daniel Huet Évèque d’Avranches.” Bulletin du  
Bibliophile et du Bibliothécaire, 1910. Paris: Librairie Henri Leclerc, 133-146. 
Villey-Desmeserets, Pierre Louis Joseph. Montaigne et François Bacon. Geneva: Slatkine  
Reprints, 1973. 
Westman, Robert S. “Huygens and the Problem of Cartesianism.” In Studies on Christiaan  
 104
Huygens : invited papers from the Symposium on the Life and Work of Christiaan 
Huygens, Amsterdam, 22-25 August 1979. ed. Bos, Rudwick, Snelders, and Visser. Lisse: 
Swetz & Zeitlinger, 1980. 
Yolton, John W. Locke and French Materialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.  
________. Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Minneapolis: University  
of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
 105
